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PLENARY POWER IN THE MODERN
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE*
CATHERINE Y. KIM**
For the past quarter century, the “plenary power” doctrine of
immigration law—under which courts suspended ordinary
standards of judicial review to defer to the political branches on
questions relating to the exclusion, detention, and deportation of
noncitizens—has been in decline. The conventional account
attributes this development to the expansion of constitutionallyprotected individual rights across public law cases. This Article
assesses changes in immigration law from a different perspective,
one having less to do with individual rights than with
constitutional structure. It focuses on the role that delegation
concerns have played, contextualizing the judiciary’s willingness
to review immigration decisions within a broader administrative
law project to strengthen judicial checks on the growing authority
of agency officials across the regulatory state.
This perspective helps explain one of the enduring puzzles of
contemporary immigration law—why courts continue to defer to
immigration decisions in some cases but not in others. Rather
than rejecting the notion of a plenary power outright, courts have
concluded that such power cannot be freely delegated to
unelected agency officials. This insight carries important
implications for the rights of noncitizens. A theory of judicial
review premised on delegation concerns rather than individual
rights offers little protection against actions by Congress and
perhaps also the President. Moreover, where the relevant actor is
an agency official, judicial scrutiny rooted in structural concerns
may be as skeptical of administrative decisions favoring
noncitizens as those harming them.
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INTRODUCTION
For much of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, federal
courts categorically denied review over government decisions that
would plainly violate constitutional rights outside of the immigration
context, citing the government’s “plenary power” to exclude, deport,
and detain noncitizens. Pursuant to this doctrine, courts allowed the
government to exclude noncitizens on the basis of race,1 deport
residents on the basis of their political opinions,2 and indefinitely
detain aliens without hearing.3 Today, by contrast, courts routinely
exercise robust review over immigration decisions, and not
infrequently reverse government policies.4 In doing so, they have
largely retreated from plenary power principles, declining to exempt
immigration law from generally applicable standards of judicial
review.5
This doctrinal shift has not escaped scholarly notice, and
commentators have been discussing the “demise” of plenary power
for decades. The dominant scholarly explanation for this decline has
attributed it to broader public law developments expanding the scope
of constitutionally protected individual rights.6 Pursuant to this view,
1. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (“If . . . the
government of the United States, through its legislative department, considers the
presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to
be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed . . . . [Such a]
determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.”); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698, 729 (1893) (sustaining legislation requiring the deportation of Chinese
nationals who fail to prove lawful presence through the testimony of “at least one credible
white witness”).
2. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 595–96 (1952) (sustaining
deportation of aliens based on prior membership in the Communist party).
3. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215–16 (1953)
(rejecting due process challenge to indefinite detention without hearing for legal
permanent resident seeking reentry).
4. See, e.g., Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1983–84 (2015) (reversing decision to
deport); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683–84 (2013) (same); Judulang v. Holder,
565 U.S. 42, 51–52 (2011) (same); Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 514 (2009) (reversing
denial of asylum); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (rejecting indefinite
detention of noncitizens without hearing); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 450
(1987) (reversing denial of asylum).
5. See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and the Supreme Court, 2009-13: A New Era
of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 111 (2015) (observing
“mainstream[ing]” of immigration into ordinary domestic law and challenging practical
import of plenary power doctrine); cf. David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram,
Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583, 588 (2017) (discussing normalization
of immigration law).
6. Peter Schuck and Hiroshi Motomura were among the first to characterize the
changes in immigration law in this manner. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After
a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation,
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the emergence of fundamental rights recognized in cases like Brown
v. Board of Education7 and Goldberg v. Kelly8 made it increasingly
difficult to justify exempting an entire category of government
decisions from judicial scrutiny; due process, equal protection, and
free speech rights had finally penetrated immigration law.9 This
individual-rights explanation, however, provides at best an
incomplete account of contemporary immigration law. While modern
courts have rejected plenary power principles in many cases, they
continue to invoke the doctrine in others. As a descriptive matter, the
conventional account fails to explain the plenary power doctrine’s
continued, albeit circumscribed, persistence.
This Article examines the vast changes in immigration
jurisprudence from a different perspective, one having less to do with
individual rights than with constitutional structure. It focuses on the
role that delegation concerns have played in the judiciary’s growing
willingness to review immigration decisions.10
Across the modern regulatory state, national policy decisions
increasingly are made by agency officials, notwithstanding the
constitutional mandate vesting legislative authority exclusively with
Congress. Article I not only requires that federal laws be enacted by
100 YALE L.J. 545, 564, 577, 595 (1990) (pointing to “gravitational pull” of equality and
due process norms in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984) (tracing changes to emerging recognition of “universal rights
based upon individuals’ essential and equal humanity”). Since then, a near consensus has
emerged, attributing modern developments in immigration law to a growing judicial
solicitude toward the rights and interests of aliens. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 366 (2002) (describing a “radical shift” in immigration law to extend due
process protections to aliens); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race
Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 57–58
(1998) (contending that due process and equal protection norms trump plenary power in
recent immigration cases); Joseph Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A Revolution
Reconsidered, 47 CONN. L. REV. 879, 882 (2015) (contending that courts have integrated
due process doctrine into immigration law in a manner that enhances individual rights);
Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 297–99 (1984) (identifying departures from plenary power
principles rooted in equality and due process norms); Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is
Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1301 (2011) (arguing that recent developments
afford “more robust judicial protection of the rights of immigrants”).
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1955).
8. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
9. See, e.g., Motomura, supra note 6, at 566–67.
10. In an essay published ten years ago discussing Judge Posner’s immigration
jurisprudence, Adam Cox called for scholarly exploration of the role that non-delegation
concerns play in modern immigration law. Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and
Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671, 1687 (2007). This Article responds to that call.
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the democratically elected members of Congress;11 it also provides
that such laws must undergo a carefully calibrated set of procedural
requirements prior to enactment.12 These measures are designed to
ensure that federal laws be subject to public accountability, are
carefully deliberated, and enjoy a sufficiently broad range of support
to mitigate the risks of factionalism, tyranny, and arbitrariness.13 Yet
Congress today routinely delegates the power to promulgate wideranging policy decisions to administrative agencies, including our
nation’s immigration agencies.14 While the Supreme Court has been
notably unwilling to enforce non-delegation requirements directly, it
has developed a series of doctrines to promote non-delegation norms
indirectly—largely through the sub-constitutional field of ordinary

11. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1–3 (vesting legislative power in Congress and specifying
electoral process for composition of House and Senate); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (“The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate or to
transfer to others, the essential legislative function with which it is . . . vested.”).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (setting forth procedural requirements of bicameralism and
presentment).
13. John Manning describes the constitutional goals served by the lawmaking
procedure as follows:
[I]t makes it more difficult for factions . . . to capture the legislative process for
private advantage, it promotes caution and restrains momentary passions, it gives
special protection to the residents of small states through the states’ equal
representation in the Senate, and it generally creates a bias in favor of filtering out
bad laws by raising the decision costs of passing any law.
John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT.
REV. 223, 239–40 (2001) (footnotes omitted); see also Bradford R. Clark, Separation of
Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2001) (describing how
federal lawmaking procedures protect separation of powers norms); Jonathan R. Macey,
How Separation of Powers Protects Individual Liberties, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 813, 819–20
(1989) (describing normative goals of constitutional lawmaking requirements).
14. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 12–13 (2014)
(criticizing modern delegations of administrative power for violating constitutional
structural requirements); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Modern Administrative
State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1232 (1994) (same); John F. Manning, Constitutional
Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 612, 618 (1996) (identifying divergence between modern administrative state and
separation-of-powers principles); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal,
101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 422 (1987) (describing modern administrative state’s failure to
incorporate sufficient checks and balances to constrain agency discretion).
This Article focuses on the non-delegation problems implicated by administrative
agencies’ exercise of policymaking authority. Doctrinal efforts to constrain agencies’
exercise of adjudicative authority are beyond the scope of this Article. See generally
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 854–56 (1986) (analyzing
congressional delegation of adjudication power to agencies). For a discussion of the
structural constitutional problems raised by agency adjudications, see Mila Sohoni, Agency
Adjudication and Judicial Nondelegation: An Article III Canon, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1569,
1571–72 (2013).

96 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2017)

82

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

administrative law—to cabin the delegated discretion of agency
officials.15 As in other regulatory fields, courts have begun to apply
these doctrines to closely scrutinize agency decisions in the
immigration context.16
This perspective contextualizes contemporary immigration law as
part and parcel of a larger administrative law project to strengthen
judicial checks on the growing authority of agency officials across the
regulatory state. On this understanding, courts have not necessarily
rejected the notion of plenary power outright but have concluded that
such power cannot freely be delegated to unelected agency officials.17
This insight carries important implications for the rights of
noncitizens. First, an exercise of judicial review motivated primarily

15. See Manning, supra note 13, at 223 (discussing influence of non-delegation norms
on evolution of doctrines of administrative deference); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary
Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 491 (2010)
(arguing that non-delegation concerns animate much of contemporary administrative law);
Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515,
520 (2015) (characterizing emergence of administrative law as “an act of constitutional
restoration, anchoring administrative governance firmly within the constitutional tradition
of employing rivalrous institutional counterweights to promote good governance, political
accountability, and compliance with the rule of law”); Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional
Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 958 (2007) (discussing non-delegation norms
promoted by administrative law doctrine announced in SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I),
318 U.S. 80 (1943)); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316–
17 (2000) (identifying canons of statutory construction that substitute for underenforcement of non-delegation doctrine).
16. Scholars in other regulatory fields traditionally viewed as “exceptional”—
including tax law, patent law, foreign affairs, and national security—have observed a
similar integration of generally applicable administrative law principles. See Jonathan
Hafetz, A Problem of Standards?: Another Perspective on Secret Law, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2141, 2144–45 (2016); Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, The Death of Tax
Court Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV. 221, 222–23 (2014); Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid
Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1903
(2015) (describing normalization of foreign affairs law); Christopher J. Walker, Chevron
Deference and Patent Exceptionalism, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 149, 149–50 (2016) (arguing
that courts integrate ordinary principles of administrative law into patent law).
17. While concepts of citizenship are closely tied to those related to immigration,
courts have not extended plenary power principles in cases involving the former. See
Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1923–24 (2017) (applying ordinary methods of
statutory interpretation to conclude that naturalization may be revoked on the basis of
false statements made during the course of naturalization proceedings only if such
statements bear a causal relationship to the naturalization decision); Sessions v. MoralesSantana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017) (applying ordinary equal protection standards to
reject statute employing sex-based classification in conferral of citizenship to child born
out of wedlock to U.S. citizen parent); Nyugen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 71 (2001) (purporting
to apply ordinary equal protection standards to sustain statute employing sex-based
classification in conferral of citizenship to child born out of wedlock); United States v.
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898) (applying Fourteenth Amendment to confer
birthright citizenship on children of Chinese immigrants).
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by delegation concerns rather than individual-rights concerns is less
likely to protect noncitizens from actions by Congress and perhaps
also the President. Second, where the relevant actor is an agency
official, judicial scrutiny rooted in structural concerns may be as
skeptical of administrative decisions benefiting noncitizens as those
harming them.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the
prevailing scholarly account of the doctrinal retreat from plenary
power principles—which emphasizes the emergence of universal
equality and due process norms—and identifies the theoretical and
practical shortcoming of this account. Part II introduces a new
perspective from which to examine shifts in immigration
jurisprudence, contending that many of the doctrinal developments in
immigration law can be traced to the same delegation concerns
animating administrative law more generally. It then shows how this
understanding helps explain why courts continue to apply plenary
power principles in some immigration cases but not in others. Part III
explores the normative implications of a retreat from plenary power
principles rooted in delegation concerns rather than individual rights.
I.

THE CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNT OF PLENARY POWER

This Part briefly describes the rise and fall of the plenary power
doctrine before setting forth the prevailing scholarly explanations for
these developments, which emphasize the role of emerging equality
and due process norms. It then identifies the theoretical and practical
limitations of this narrative, which fails to provide a satisfactory
account for the doctrine’s continued, albeit circumscribed,
persistence.
A. The Shift in Immigration Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court’s contemporary immigration jurisprudence
bears little resemblance to its historical precedent. During what
scholars refer to as the “classical” era of immigration law, roughly
dating from the late nineteenth century through the Cold War,18 the
Supreme Court routinely sustained government decisions that would
plainly violate constitutional rights had they occurred outside of the
immigration context, reasoning that the political branches possess
“plenary power” to exclude, deport, and detain noncitizens without
judicial restraint. Today, by contrast, the Court routinely exercises
18. See Motomura, supra note 6, at 550–54 (defining the “classical” period of
immigration law); Schuck, supra note 6, at 3 (same).
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close scrutiny over immigration decisions, typically without even
mentioning plenary power principles.
1. The Classical Era
The Court first announced what came to be known as the
plenary power doctrine in Chae Chan Ping v. United States,19 a case
challenging the exclusion of Chinese nationals from the United
States.20 In 1882, Congress enacted the first of a series of Chinese
Exclusion Acts, which prohibited the entry of noncitizens of Chinese
ancestry, but allowed such individuals to depart and re-enter if they
had already established residence in the United States and obtained a
government certificate of reentry prior to their departure.21 Chae was
a longtime legal resident of the United States who had left the
country for a temporary trip to China in 1887 after securing the
requisite reentry certificate.22 While he was abroad, however,
Congress enacted a new statute barring the entry of all Chinese
noncitizens, including returning legal residents who had a valid
certificate for reentry.23 When Chae was denied reentry, he
challenged his race-based exclusion and further claimed that the
refusal to honor his certificate of reentry violated his due process
rights.24 Rejecting these claims, a unanimous Supreme Court
concluded:
If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its
legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a
different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to
be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to
be stayed . . . . [I]ts determination is conclusive upon the
judiciary.25

19. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
20. Id. at 589.
21. The Chinese Exclusion Acts barred all noncitizens of Chinese ancestry, regardless
of the individual’s actual nationality. See Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue
Ting: The Origins of Plenary Power, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 7, 8 (David A. Martin &
Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005). Moreover, individuals of Chinese ancestry at the time were
precluded from citizenship by naturalization. Id.
22. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 584; see also Chin, supra note 21, at 7–13 (describing factual background in
Chae Chan Ping).
25. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606 (emphasis added). The justifications for this
radical departure from ordinary standards of judicial review were somewhat oblique. The
constitutional text does not explicitly vest either Congress or the President with the power
to regulate immigration, much less the unreviewable power to do so. While it delegates to
the political branches somewhat related powers, such as the power to regulate

96 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2017)

2017]

PLENARY POWER

85

Chae Chan Ping now stands for the proposition that decisions to
exclude noncitizens at the border are not subject to judicial review
and are instead vested exclusively in the political branches.26
The Court affirmed these plenary power principles four years
later in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,27 challenging another iteration
of the Chinese Exclusion Act, this one mandating the arrest and
deportation of all Chinese immigrants within the country who failed
to produce at least one “credible white witness” to testify to their
lawful presence.28 Fong Yue Ting was ordered deported pursuant to
this provision, even though the testimony of his non-white witnesses
was sufficient to persuade the reviewing judge that Fong was, in fact,
present in the United States lawfully.29 These restrictions—the racial
qualifications for testimonial witnesses and imposition of the burden
on the accused to effectively prove her innocence in order to avoid
detention and exile—clearly would not survive constitutional scrutiny
had they been imposed on citizens. Yet the Court relied on its
reasoning in Chae Chan Ping to sustain these restrictions in Fong’s
case, finding that the political branches’ power to detain and remove
noncitizens within the nation’s borders is as plenary and unreviewable
as the power to exclude noncitizens from its territorial soil: “The right
of a nation to expel or deport foreigners, who have not been
naturalized . . . , rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and
unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the
country.”30 In doing so, the Court denied noncitizens any
constitutionally cognizable interest not only in returning to, but also
in remaining in, the United States.
Importantly, even before either Chae Chan Ping or Fong Yue
Ting was decided, the Court made clear in Yick Wo v. Hopkins31 that
the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection applied to aliens and
citizens alike.32 Invalidating a San Francisco ordinance that had been

naturalization and foreign commerce and to act in foreign affairs, the Constitution makes
no provision for the immigration and deportation of noncitizens. See, e.g., Louis Henkin,
The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its
Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 857 (1987) (criticizing the judicial conclusion that the
federal government’s power to regulate immigration, although unenumerated in the
Constitution, is inherent in sovereignty).
26. Henkin, supra note 25, at 854.
27. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
28. Id. at 727.
29. Id. at 704.
30. Id. at 707.
31. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
32. Id. at 368.
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used to discriminatorily deny licenses to Chinese laundry operators,
Yick Wo unequivocally held:
The rights of the petitioners . . . are not less because they are
aliens . . . . The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is
not confined to the protection of citizens. . . . [Its] provisions are
universal in their application, to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race,
of color, or of nationality.33
The Supreme Court, however, distinguished cases involving the entry
and removal of noncitizens from ordinary domestic regulation such as
that at issue in Yick Wo.34 While the latter remained subject to
ordinary standards of review, the Court made clear in Fong Yue Ting
that the former was categorically immunized from judicial scrutiny:
Chinese laborers . . . like all other aliens residing in the United
States for a shorter or longer time, are entitled, so long as they
are permitted by the government of the United States to remain
in the country, to the safeguards of the constitution . . . . But
they continue to be aliens . . . and therefore remain subject to
the power of congress to expel them, or to order them to be
removed and deported from the country, whenever, in its
judgment, their removal is necessary or expedient for the public
interest.35
After Fong Yue Ting, noncitizens within the United States would
be entitled to the full protection of the Constitution on domestic
regulatory matters but denied any legal protection with respect to
their removal from the United States under the plenary power
doctrine.36
33. Id. at 368–69.
34. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 724–25.
35. Id. at 724; see also id. at 731 (“The question whether, and upon what conditions,
these aliens shall be permitted to remain within the United States being one to be
determined by the political departments of the government, the judicial department
cannot properly express an opinion upon the wisdom, the policy, or the justice of the
measures enacted by congress in the exercise of the powers confided to it by the
constitution over this subject.”).
36. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382–83 (1971) (holding that state
denial of welfare benefits to noncitizens would violate equal protection); Takahashi v. Fish
& Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948) (rejecting denial of fishing licenses on basis of
alienage on Equal Protection grounds); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915)
(invalidating restrictions on alien employment as violation of equal protection); see also T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT’L L.
862, 869–70 (1989) (discussing doctrinal distinction between alienage laws and
immigration laws). For a discussion of the contested nature of the boundary between
immigration law on the one hand and alienage law on the other, see Linda Bosniak,
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During the Cold War, the Court extended plenary power
principles further. In United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,37 the
Court held that noncitizens have no constitutional right to challenge,
or even learn the reasons for, their exclusion, stating “[w]hatever the
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an
alien denied entry is concerned.38 In doing so, it held that noncitizens
not only have no substantive right to enter the United States, but also
lack any procedural rights to challenge a denial of entry.39
Then, in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,40 it went so
far as to deny review over an exclusion decision that resulted in the
prolonged and potentially permanent detention of the noncitizen.41 In
that case, the government, on the basis of secret evidence and without
hearing, denied reentry to Mezei, a longtime legal permanent resident
who sought to return to his U.S. citizen family after a trip overseas.42
Because no other country was willing to repatriate him, Mezei was
placed in detention, where he remained for years, with little prospect
for release.43 Rejecting his constitutional claims, the Court reasoned
that Mezei’s detention was a mere byproduct of the exclusion
decision and thus immunized from judicial intervention: “Whatever
our individual estimate of [the government’s] policy and the fears on
which it rests, respondent’s right to enter the United States depends
on the congressional will, and courts cannot substitute their judgment
for the legislative mandate.”44 By the 1950s, then, the plenary power
principles extended so far as to sustain even the prolonged and
potentially permanent detention of noncitizens without hearing.45
2. The Contemporary Era
Contemporary immigration jurisprudence today bears little
resemblance to the early plenary power cases. Today, federal courts
routinely exercise close scrutiny over immigration decisions, often
Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047,
1056 (1994) (conceptualizing immigration law as allocation of rights and benefits to
noncitizens).
37. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
38. Id. at 544.
39. Id.
40. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
41. Id. at 216.
42. Id. at 207–09.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 216.
45. For a contemporaneous criticism of the Knauff and Mezei decisions, see Henry M.
Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1391–95 (1953).
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without mentioning plenary power at all. Over the past quarter
century in particular, the Supreme Court in case after case has
applied generally applicable standards of judicial review to vacate
decisions to exclude, detain, and deport noncitizens. In one of the
clearest departures from prior doctrine, the Court in Zadvydas v.
Davis46 discarded plenary power principles to curtail the
government’s power to detain noncitizens.47 Zadvydas was a longtime
legal permanent resident who had been ordered deported on the basis
of a criminal offense.48 He was placed in detention pending his
removal, but, like the noncitizen in Mezei, faced the prospect of
prolonged detention because no other country was willing to
repatriate him.49 Yet the Supreme Court held in Zadvydas that the
indefinite detention of noncitizens posed a sufficiently grave threat to
constitutional rights to necessitate the imposition of a judicial time
limit on the length of statutorily authorized detention.50
In the modern era, the Supreme Court has exercised review over
decisions to exclude, detain, and deport noncitizens with striking
regularity. It has granted certiorari in at least one immigration case
every term since 2009 and vacated a government immigration
decision roughly every other year.51 And in the vast majority of these
46. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
47. See id. at 702.
48. Id. at 684.
49. The Court purported to distinguish the case from Mezei on the ground that
Zadvydas was detained after he was ordered deported, while Mezei was detained after
being denied reentry. Id. at 693–94. The distinction, however, is not entirely persuasive.
After all, Zadvydas had already been ordered deported and thus, like Mezei, possessed no
legal right to be in the country. See id. at 684. If anything, Mezei, who had been detained
for nearly two years and was not provided notice of the charges against him, Shaughnessy
v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 208–09 (1953), had a stronger claim of
procedural violations than Zadvydas, who had been detained for a shorter period and only
after a full hearing to adjudicate his removability, see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–85; see
also N. Alejandra Arroyave, Comment, Preserving the Essence of Zadvydas v. Davis in the
Midst of a National Tragedy, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 235, 251 (2002) (discussing Justice
Scalia’s criticism of majority’s attempt to distinguish Mezei).
50. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
51. See, e.g., Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 (2017) (reversing
order to deport noncitizen on basis of criminal record); Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980,
1991 (2015) (same); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1693–94 (2013) (same);
Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 64 (2011) (same); Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 514
(2009) (vacating exclusion of alien seeking asylum); see also Johnson supra note 5, at 117–
18 (summarizing immigration cases from 2009–2013 terms); Kevin R. Johnson, Big
Immigration Cases in the 2016 Term, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (June 29, 2016),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2016/06/big-immigration-cases-in-the-2016term.html [http://perma.cc/SSK2-KZ2D] (summarizing immigration cases in the 2016
term); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court in the 2015 Term,
IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (Oct. 9, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration
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cases, the Court has applied ordinary standards of judicial review
rather than granting plenary deference to the government.52
B.

Prevailing Theoretical Explanation

The doctrinal retreat from plenary power principles has not
escaped scholarly notice.53 The prevailing theoretical explanation for
this doctrinal shift has characterized it as a belated integration of
public law norms, asserting the universal application of a robust set of
Equal Protection and Due Process rights into the immigration
context. While this explanation undoubtedly possesses normative
appeal, the Court’s decisions do not consistently conform to it,
significantly compromising its predictive value.
Scholars have been discussing the “demise” of plenary power for
decades. With few exceptions, they have attributed it to broader
public law developments expanding the scope of constitutionally
protected individual rights.54 Peter Schuck was among the first to
observe a “fundamental transformation” of immigration law.55
Writing in 1984, he characterized this shift as signaling judicial
acceptance of “communitarian” public law norms rooted in “universal
rights based upon individuals’ essential and equal humanity.”56
Hiroshi Motomura similarly conceptualized the “gradual demise” of
the plenary power doctrine as a response to the “gravitational pull” of
norms “develop[ed] elsewhere in the constitutional law of individual
rights and liberties,” creating new “phantom norms” in the realm in
immigration law.57 These views have developed into a near consensus
/2015/10/immigration-in-the-supreme-court-in-the-2015-term.html [http://perma.cc/8LCRER4B] (summarizing immigration cases in the 2015 term); Kevin R. Johnson, Supreme
Court Immigration Rulings in the 2014 Term, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (June 15, 2015),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2015/06/suprme-court-immigration-rulingsin-the-2014-term.html [http://perma.cc/CA8H-W4HN] (summarizing immigration cases in
the 2014 term).
52. See, e.g., Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1567; Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1991;
Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1693–94; Judulang, 565 U.S. at 64; Negusie, 555 U.S. at 514.
53. See, e.g., Motomura, supra note 6, at 549 (describing retreat of plenary power
doctrine); Schuck, supra note 6, at 58 (same); Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary
Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 339 (2002) (same).
54. For exceptions, see David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine
Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 31 (2015) (arguing that plenary power doctrine should be
understood to resolve allocation of immigration authority between federal government
and States, rather than claim that sovereignty trumps individual rights), Spiro, supra note
54, at 340–41 (attributing retreat of plenary power doctrine to changed global order in
which United States is no longer hegemonic).
55. Schuck, supra note 6, at 4.
56. Id. at 3–4.
57. Motomura, supra note 6, at 549, 566, 577.
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tracing the evolution of immigration law to the expansion of equal
protection and due process rights recognized in cases like Brown v.
Board of Education and Goldberg v. Kelly.58
This explanation no doubt presents normative appeal. The
plenary power doctrine has always been difficult to reconcile with the
principle announced in Yick Wo, extending constitutional protections
to citizens and aliens alike.59 As the Court has stated, the denial of
constitutional protections to a category of individuals creates “an
underclass present[ing] most difficult problems for a Nation that
prides itself on adherence to principles of equality under the law.”60 If
Equal Protection and Due Process rights are fundamental and
universal, it is difficult to see why they should not apply in the
immigration context.
As a descriptive matter, however, the individual-rights account
provides at best an incomplete explanation for the shifts in
immigration jurisprudence.61 It is true that modern courts frequently
reverse immigration decisions, often failing to even mention the
plenary power doctrine.62 Yet courts continue to invoke plenary
power principles to deny noncitizens’ claims from time to time. As
late as 1977, the Supreme Court in Fiallo v. Bell63 refused to apply
ordinary standards of equal protection scrutiny over the government’s
“double-barreled” discrimination granting preferential immigration
status on the basis of sex and illegitimacy, concluding that “the power
to expel or exclude aliens [is] a fundamental sovereign attribute
exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune
from judicial control.”64 And as recently as 2015, Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in Kerry v. Din65 invoked the plenary power doctrine to
reject a due process challenge to the denial of an immigration visa.66
Scholars have proposed more limited versions of the individualrights account to explain why courts are willing to protect noncitizens’
rights in some contexts but not others. Some offer a substantive58. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
59. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368–69 (1886).
60. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 (1982).
61. Proponents of the individual-rights theory acknowledge this limitation. See
Motomura, supra note 6, at 549 (identifying “conflicts and contradictions among the
cases” that “have frustrated the efforts of courts and commentators to be more precise”
about the plenary power doctrine’s ongoing relevance); Schuck, supra note 6, at 75 (“[T]he
transformation of immigration law has significantly increased its indeterminacy . . . .”).
62. See supra Section I.A.2.
63. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
64. Id. at 792, 794.
65. 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015).
66. Id. at 2139–40 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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procedural distinction in the courts’ willingness to recognize
individual rights in the immigration context, while others propose an
insider-outsider distinction to explain the courts’ decisions. Neither of
these distinctions, however, provides an entirely satisfactory
explanation for the courts’ modern immigration jurisprudence.
1. Substantive Versus Procedural Rights
One version of the individual-rights thesis suggests that the
retreat from plenary power principles has been limited to a judicial
willingness to recognize noncitizens’ procedural, but not substantive,
rights. Under this view, courts have preserved plenary power
principles to insulate the government’s substantive decisions as to
which aliens to exclude, detain, or deport; but they have retreated
from these principles to impose procedural restrictions on how such
decisions are made.67
This explanation, however, does not map neatly onto the case
law. The Court continues to apply plenary power principles even in
cases raising only procedural rather than substantive claims. In Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council,68 involving the repatriation of migrant
Haitians intercepted on the high seas, the plaintiffs asserted no
substantive right to be admitted into the United States or resist
repatriation to Haiti; they claimed a right only to some sort of
procedure to determine whether they fell within the congressionally
defined category of individuals who could be admitted or at least not
repatriated.69 Likewise, in Demore v. Kim,70 involving a challenge to
the mandatory detention of aliens pending removal proceedings, the
plaintiff did not claim that he was substantively entitled to release; he
sought only a procedural right to a bond hearing to determine
whether release was warranted.71 Yet in both cases, the Court did not

67. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law:
Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625,
1631–32 (1992) (discussing recognition of “procedural due process” rights in immigration
law, which “tries to fill the vacuum in substantive constitutional rights that the plenary
power doctrine has created”); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door,
1993 WIS. L. REV. 965, 969–72 (1993) (examining the plenary power doctrine in the face of
changing international norms and changing conceptions of sovereignty, including
traditional procedural due process conceptions). See generally Motomura, supra note 6
(analyzing traditional reliance on procedural due process rights in immigration case law).
68. 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
69. Id. at 166–67.
70. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
71. See id. at 522–23.
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hesitate to apply the plenary power doctrine to deny these limited
procedural claims.72
At the same time, the Court routinely applies ordinary standards
of judicial review in immigration cases asserting substantive claims,
thus retreating from plenary power principles. In a string of cases
beginning with Judulang v. Holder,73 none of which involved
allegations of procedural unfairness, the Court applied ordinary
standards of judicial review to reject the government’s substantive
grounds for deporting the noncitizen.74 These cases suggest that the
procedural versus substantive nature of a noncitizen’s claim is an
unreliable predictor for whether a court will apply plenary power
principles in a given case.
2. Insiders Versus Outsiders
Another version of the individual-rights thesis distinguishes
between “insiders” and “outsiders” to explain the doctrinal retreat
from plenary power principles. Pursuant to this view, the Court has
been willing to depart from plenary power principles to recognize the
individual rights of noncitizens deemed to fall within an “insider”
category. Plenary power continues to apply with full force, however,
to deny any individual rights to those deemed “outsiders.”75
Even within this narrative, the line between insiders and
outsiders is subject to debate. Some have interpreted the case law to
extend individual-rights protections to “insiders” as defined by their
physical presence in the United States, while denying such protections
to “outsiders” remaining outside our nation’s borders; others suggest
that the case law defines insider status based on lawful presence and
that plenary power continues to deny any individual rights not only to
aliens outside of our borders but also to undocumented noncitizens
within.76
72. See id. at 513; Sale, 509 U.S. at 187.
73. 565 U.S. 42 (2011).
74. See id. at 52–53 (employing ordinary modes of statutory construction to reject
removal of alien on basis of criminal conviction); see also Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions,
137 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 (2017) (same); Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1984 (2015) (same);
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1693–94 (2013) (same).
75. See LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF
CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 51–53 (2006); Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who Are Not the
People: The Changing Rights of Immigrants in the United States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 367, 378–97 (2013) (discussing the varying approaches taken to cases involving
insiders vs. “putative outsiders”); Daniel I. Morales, Immigration Reform and the
Democratic Will, 16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 49, 50–52 (2013) (examining the
inside/outside distinction).
76. See BOSNIAK, supra note 75, at 125–26.
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Again, however, modern cases do not adhere to such distinctions.
In Demore v. Kim, the mandatory detention case described above, the
claimant would have qualified as an “insider” under any definition of
the term, as he was a legal permanent resident who had not yet been
adjudicated deportable.77 Such physical and even lawful presence in
the United States imposed no obstacle to the applicability of plenary
power principles to deny him the individual rights claimed.78

*

*

*

Contemporary immigration law does not consistently conform to
an individual-rights explanation for the decline of plenary power.
While the Court discards plenary power principles in favor of
noncitizens’ interests in some cases, it continues to apply the doctrine
in others. Neither a distinction between substantive and procedural
rights nor one based on an alien’s insider versus outsider status
provides a satisfactory explanation for why courts continue to defer to
the political branches’ immigration decisions in some cases, while
exercising robust judicial review in others.
II. IMMIGRATION LAW THROUGH A NON-DELEGATION LENS
This Part examines immigration jurisprudence from a slightly
different perspective, one focused less on individual rights than on
constitutional structure. It contextualizes changes in immigration law
within a broader trend common across the modern administrative
state, in which courts have grown increasingly skeptical toward the
scope of discretionary authority exercised by unelected agency
officials. The first Section examines the classical era of immigration
law from this perspective, showing that courts during this period
equated the scope of agencies’ immigration power with that of
Congress. The second Section analyzes the subsequent expansion of
administrative discretion and the threat these developments posed to
constitutional non-delegation norms. The third Section recounts how
immigration law responded to these developments by subjecting
immigration officials to a series of administrative law doctrines
77. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 513.
78. At the same time, the Supreme Court has retreated from plenary power principles
to confer individual legal rights to noncitizens who are “outsiders,” at least as defined by
lawful rather than physical presence. For example, the claimant in Negusie v. Holder, 555
U.S. 511 (2009), was an “outsider” in that he was seeking formal admission into the United
States as an asylee, yet the Court applied ordinary standards of judicial review to vacate
the government’s denial of his application. See id. at 514–16. In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982), the Supreme Court applied even closer scrutiny than required under ordinary
equal protection analysis to reject the denial of education to the “outsider” group of
undocumented aliens. See id. at 230.
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designed to mitigate delegation concerns. The final Section contends
that this account, in which shifts to immigration jurisprudence are
largely animated by delegation concerns, helps explain one of the
central puzzles in contemporary immigration law—why courts
continue to defer to government immigration decisions in some cases
but not others.
A. The Classical Period: Conflating the Immigration Power of
Congress and Agencies
During the classical era of immigration law, the Supreme Court
not only vested Congress with the unreviewable power to render
immigration decisions, but also extended such power to administrative
officials as well. When the plenary power doctrine was first
announced in Chae Chan Ping, it was identified as a power belonging
to Congress.79 Only three years later, however, the Court in
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States80 suggested that the delegated
immigration authority of administrative officials was as plenary and
unreviewable as that of Congress itself.81 In that case, a noncitizen
brought a due process challenge to her exclusion on the ground that
she was likely to become a public charge.82 Importantly, Nishimura
did not challenge the legislative authority to exclude such noncitizens;
rather, her challenge was limited to the agency’s conclusion that she
in fact fell within the legislative category to be excluded.83 Rejecting
that claim, the Supreme Court extended the plenary power doctrine
to immunize the administrative finding that a particular individual fell
within the legislative category: “As to [foreigners seeking permission
to enter the United States], the decisions of executive or
administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by
Congress, are due process of law.”84

79. The Supreme Court stated:
If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its legislative
department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country,
who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their
exclusion is not to be stayed . . . . [I]ts determination is conclusive upon the
judiciary.
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (emphasis added).
80. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
81. Id. at 660.
82. See id. at 656.
83. Id. at 658.
84. Id. at 660.
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Significantly, immigration officials during this period enjoyed
only limited statutory authority to engage in discretionary
decisionmaking.85 Statutes promulgated during that era circumscribed
the power of agency officials, delegating relatively narrow fact-finding
authority and specifying a small class of officials authorized to make
exclusion decisions.86 For example, the first statute imposing
substantive restrictions on non-citizens’ entry into the United States
delegated to state customs officials authority to determine whether an
arriving alien would be excluded because he or she was a “convict,
lunatic, idiot,” or likely to become a public charge.87 Those statutes
were consistent with what scholars refer to as the “transmission belt”
model of administrative governance that prevailed in the earlier days
of our republic.88 Pursuant to this model, Congress was understood to
make all substantive rules, delegating to agencies only limited
authority to decide whether a given rule applied to a particular case.89
During this era, when agency discretion was already strictly
circumscribed by statute, the Court was unwilling to impose
additional constraints on it.
B.

Emerging Delegation Concerns in the Modern Administrative
State

As regulatory needs became increasingly complex and technical,
however, Congress proved incapable of anticipating, much less
resolving, the multitude of issues confronting modern government.
Recognizing its limitations, Congress began to delegate increasingly
open-ended grants of authority to administrative agencies,90 “leaving
to the relevant agency’s discretion major questions of public policy.”91
This Section shows the particularly expansive breadth of
policymaking authority vested in our nation’s immigration agencies
and then analyzes the constitutional harms threatened by such
administrative power.
85. As Gerald Neuman has documented, Congress did not meaningfully restrict
immigration into the country until the 1880s. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of
American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1834–35 (1993).
86. See, e.g., Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214, 214.
87. Id.
88. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2253
(2001).
89. As then-Professor Elena Kagan noted, “[t]he first generation of the nation’s
regulatory statutes . . . largely followed this model . . . , containing detailed and limited
grants of authority to administrative bodies.” Id. at 2255.
90. See generally PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES (3d ed. 2016) (describing the emergence of the modern regulatory state).
91. Kagan, supra note 88, at 2255.
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1. Discretionary Authority of Immigration Agencies
Nowhere is the administrative exercise of policymaking authority
more evident than in the immigration context.92 As the Supreme
Court recently acknowledged, the “broad discretion exercised by
immigration officials” constitutes “[a] principal feature” of our
immigration system.93 The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)
delegates exceedingly broad authority to develop policies governing
the admission, detention, and deportation of noncitizens to a vast and
sprawling immigration bureaucracy—spread across multiple agencies
including the immigration courts and the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) within the Department of Justice, the Bureau of
Consular Affairs and Office of Visa Affairs within the State
Department, and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”), Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) within the
Department of Homeland Security.94
Like all agencies, immigration agencies must interpret the
governing statute to determine whether a particular provision applies
to a given case.95 In the immigration context, however, the governing
statute employs exceptionally broad and ambiguous language.96 For
92. See SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 7–13 (2015) (describing the
extent of prosecutorial discretion in the immigration system); Daniel Kanstroom,
Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law,
71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 751–52 (1997) (“Although administrative discretion permeates many
aspects of contemporary U.S. law, its impact in immigration law is exceptional.”); Gerald
L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 625–26 (2006)
(discussing scope of discretion vested in immigration officials).
93. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012); see also e.g., Bill Ong Hing,
The Failure of Prosecutorial Discretion and the Deportation of Oscar Martinez, 15
SCHOLAR 437, 499–504 (2013) (criticizing wide discretion afforded to removal officers);
Catherine Y. Kim, Immigration Separation of Powers and the President’s Power to
Preempt, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 709–12 (2014) (discussing scope of executive
branch discretion in immigration law); Neuman, supra note 92, at 611 (criticizing agency
discretion in determining which noncitizens to deport).
94. For a discussion of the respective roles of agency leadership and street-level
bureaucrats in developing immigration policy, see Joseph Landau, Bureaucratic
Administration: Experimentation and Immigration Law, 65 DUKE L.J. 1173, 1187–88
(2016). For an overview of the various agencies involved in the U.S. immigration system,
see id. at 1190–92; Immigration Law (U.S.) Research Guide: Federal Agencies,
GEORGETOWN LAW LIBRARY, http://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=273371&p=1824781
[https://perma.cc/U5N4-VEG5] (last updated Apr. 8, 2016) (listing federal agencies with
immigration authority).
95. See Kanstroom, supra note 92, at 759.
96. See id. In fact, the Supreme Court is currently considering whether the statutory
provision authorizing the removal of noncitizens convicted of a “crime of violence” is
unconstitutionally void for vagueness. See Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1111 (9th Cir.
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example, the INA precludes the entry of most aliens who have
committed “a crime involving moral turpitude” but provides no
guidelines for which offenses constitute such crimes.97 Similarly, it
requires an alien to have “good moral character” to qualify for certain
visa categories98 and certain types of relief from removal.99 The
statute lists examples that would preclude a finding of good moral
character but explicitly provides that the list is non-exhaustive,
leaving agency officials free to conclude that virtually any noncitizen
lacks the requisite good moral character.100
Moreover, statutory requirements for entry into the United
States frequently hinge on the applicant’s subjective state of mind,
leaving to agencies the discretion to develop indicia for compliance.
For example, many temporary visas require the alien to have a
“residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of
abandoning,”101 which agency officials determine based on a wide
range of factors such as land ownership, financial security, and family
relations. Similarly, to determine whether an asylum applicant has the
requisite “well-founded fear of persecution” if returned to her
homeland,102 agencies have developed extensive and complex rules to
define the types of “persecution” that qualify and determine whether
the alien’s fear is “well-founded.”103
The scope of delegated authority vested in immigration agencies
exceeds that in other regulatory areas in another respect: numerous
2015) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2015)), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 31 (2016),
reargued sub nom., Sessions v. Dimaya, No. 15-1498 (Oct. 2 2017),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/15-1498.html [https://perma.cc
/C3DD-J8KE].
97. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2012); cf. id. § 1101 (providing definitions for
various terms used in the INA but omitting definition of “crime of moral turpitude”).
98. See, e.g., id. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iv) (allowing certain noncitizen victims of domestic
violence to self-petition for immigrant visa only where they show they have “good moral
character”); id. § 1259 (providing for legal permanent resident status to certain noncitizens
who have resided continuously in the United States since prior to January 1, 1972 upon
showing of “good moral character”).
99. See, e.g., id. § 1229b(b)(1)(B) (requiring “good moral character” as criterion for
eligibility for discretionary cancellation of removal and adjustment of status to lawful
permanent resident).
100. Id. § 1101(f).
101. See id. § 1101(a)(15)(B), (F)(i), (H)(ii), (J), (O)(ii)(IV), (P), (Q)(i).
102. Id. § 1101(a)(42) (setting forth definition of “refugee”); id. § 1158 (setting forth
criteria for asylum).
103. See, e.g., M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 234 (B.I.A. 2014) (interpreting meaning
of “particular social group” for purposes of qualification for asylum); T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec.
163, 170 (B.I.A. 2007) (interpreting meaning of “persecution” in cases involving economic
harm); O-Z-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 23, 26–27 (B.I.A. 1998) (interpreting meaning of
“persecution” in context of actions by non-governmental actors).
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INA provisions set forth minimum statutory eligibility requirements
but then delegate to agencies virtually unfettered discretion to make a
decision once those minimum criteria are satisfied. More specifically,
the INA explicitly delegates to immigration agencies wide authority
to exclude aliens who otherwise fall within statutory categories for
admission, as well as to admit those who otherwise fall within
statutory categories for exclusion. For example, section 208 of the
INA provides that a noncitizen qualifies for admission as an asylee
only if she establishes a “well-founded fear of persecution on account
of” one of five protected grounds, among other requirements.104
Satisfaction of these statutory requirements is insufficient for
admission, however, as the asylum applicant must also obtain a
favorable exercise of discretion from the immigration agency: a
decision subject to no statutory guidelines.105 On the flip side,
section 212(a) sets forth an extensive list of grounds precluding an
individual’s entry into the United States, such as the commission of
certain crimes or the absence of requisite travel documents, but
section 212(d) delegates to agency officials discretion to admit, on a
temporary non-immigrant basis, virtually any alien who would
otherwise be statutorily barred from entering the United States.106
Immigration officials enjoy even wider latitude to allow aliens
who fall within statutory categories for removal to nonetheless remain
in the United States. In 1996, Congress vastly expanded the types of
criminal conduct that would render an alien deportable.107 As a
consequence, thousands of noncitizens, including many longtime legal
residents, suddenly became deportable.108 Historically, the only way
an alien subject to removal could escape deportation was through the
enactment of a private bill in Congress.109 Since 1940, however, the

104. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); id. § 1158(b)(1)(A).
105. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(A).
106. See id. § 1182(a) (setting forth extensive grounds for inadmissibility); id.
§ 1182(d)(3)(A) (granting administrative discretion to waive virtually any ground of
inadmissibility for temporary nonimmigrants).
107. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009-546, at 3009-627 to -628 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43) (2016)) (expanding definition of “aggravated felony”); id. § 350,
110 Stat. at 3009-639 to -640 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E) (2012))
(adding offenses of domestic violence and stalking as grounds for removal); Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 435, 110 Stat. 1214, 1274–
75 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2012)) (expanding grounds for
removal based on commission of crimes).
108. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law,
119 YALE L.J. 458, 462 (2009).
109. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 933 (1983).

96 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2017)

2017]

PLENARY POWER

99

mechanisms for granting relief to an alien otherwise subject to
removal have proliferated. The INA today sets forth a wide variety of
forms of relief, including “cancellation of removal,”110 waivers of
specific grounds for removal,111 “stay[s] of removal,”112 and
“parole.”113 Pursuant to these provisions, once an alien establishes
minimum threshold eligibility criteria, immigration officers are
directed to exercise discretion in determining whether such relief
from removal will be awarded.114 Moreover, such officials enjoy
virtually limitless power to determine whether the alien will be
detained or released, with or without a bond, pending removal
proceedings.115
Congress has further expanded the power of immigration
agencies by insulating many of their decisions from any form of
judicial review.116 The INA explicitly precludes judicial review over a
wide swath of immigration decisions, including those relating to the
“expedited removal” of aliens alleged to be inadmissible on grounds
of fraud or lack of documentation;117 those relating to the removal of
110. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.
111. See, e.g., id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) (waiver for inadmissibility based on prior unlawful
presence); id. § 1182(d)(3) (waiver for nonimmigrant inadmissibility); id. § 1182(g) (waiver
for inadmissibility based on health-related grounds); id. § 1182(h) (waiver of
inadmissibility based on commission of certain offenses); id. § 1182(i) (waiver of
inadmissibility for fraud or misrepresentation); id. § 1183 (waiver of inadmissibility based
on becoming a public charge); id. § 1227(a)(1)(E)(iii) (waiver for deportability based on
smuggling of family members); id. § 1227(a)(1)(H) (waiver for deportability based on
fraud or misrepresentation).
112. Id. § 1231(c)(2).
113. Id. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
114. See, e.g., id. (“The Attorney General may . . . in his discretion parole into the
United States . . . any alien applying for admission to the United States[.]”).
115. Id. § 1226(a). But see id. §§ 1226(c), 1226a (imposing mandatory detention for
certain criminal aliens or suspected terrorists). Although the statute provides no guidelines
for how detention determinations shall be made, the agencies have concluded that the
decision should be based on whether the alien poses a flight risk or a danger to the
community. See Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38 (B.I.A. 2006). These officials consider a
range of factors such as employment history, length of residence in the United States,
community ties, and criminal record. See Sugay, 17 I. & N. Dec. 637, 638–39 (B.I.A. 1981).
116. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(3), 1158(b)(2)(D), 1252(a)(2). The judge-made
doctrine of consular nonreviewability has also played a role in insulating immigration
agency decisions from external constraints. Pursuant to this doctrine, policies relating to
visa denials by overseas consular officers are not subject to judicial review. See generally
James A.R. Nafziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular Officials, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1
(1991) (describing limits on supervisory review over consular officers); Tatyana E.
Delgado, Note, Leaving the Doctrine of Consular Absolutism Behind, 24 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 55 (2009) (criticizing absence of supervisory and judicial checks on visa decisions).
117. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(A), 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (mandating removal for arriving
aliens without sufficient documentation “without further hearing or review” and insulating
such actions from judicial review).
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aliens based on the commission of past crimes;118 those designated in
the INA as being within the discretion of the Attorney General or
Secretary of Homeland Security;119 and those relating to certain forms
of relief from removal.120 Such insulation from judicial review ensures
that agency officials have the final word in defining large swaths of
our nation’s immigration policy.
Immigration agencies also exercise forms of discretion beyond
those delegated by statute, and such decisions are not subject to any
form of judicial review. Congress and the courts have not only
tolerated these practices, but have endorsed them. First, as in any
enforcement context, immigration officials exercise prosecutorial
discretion to determine which removal cases to initiate and pursue.121
As Professors Cox and Rodriguez have noted, the scope of
prosecutorial discretion vested in immigration agencies is particularly
broad, given that Congress has statutorily mandated the full removal
of one-third of all resident noncitizens while providing the
immigration agencies with the resources to actually effectuate
removal in only four percent of these cases.122 Second, immigration
agencies routinely exercise prosecutorial discretion to grant
affirmative relief allowing statutorily deportable aliens to remain in
the United States through the mechanisms of “administrative
118. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(C). The Supreme Court interpreted this provision narrowly to
avoid constitutional concerns. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305 (2001).
119. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
120. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
121. See WADHIA, supra note 92, at 7–13.
122. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 108, at 462–63; see also HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 26–27 (2014) (“The practical reality of immigration
law enforcement is that the federal government tries to remove only a small fraction of the
unauthorized migrants in the United States.”); Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. of
Immigration and Customs Enf’t, to all ICE Employees 1 (Mar. 2, 2011),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf [https://perma.cc
/5ZYS-D7CM] (noting that then-current funding levels would have allowed the federal
government to remove at most four percent of the estimated 12 million undocumented
aliens from the United States each year).
The Supreme Court in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), which did not involve
immigration, held that administrative exercises of such prosecutorial discretion generally
are not subject to judicial review. Id. at 837–38 (holding the FDA’s refusal to enforce
FDCA requirements against states that utilized lethal injection drugs was not judicially
reviewable). For examples of the vast body of scholarship criticizing this decision, see
Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet
Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 856 (1988) (arguing the Heckler
decision “demonstrate[d] the Court’s rejection of its prior checks and balances
approach.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 653, 653–54 (1985) (casting doubt on the usefulness of the distinction
between agency action and inaction and arguing judicial review serves as important
constraint on regulation).
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closure”123 and “deferred action.”124 Far from limiting administrative
authority, Congress has appeared to approve of such extra-statutory
grants of administrative relief.125 In these ways, the power to
promulgate national immigration policy is increasingly exercised less
by Congress, and more by the officials populating our nation’s
administrative agencies.
2. Threats to Separation-of-Powers Norms
Administrative exercises of such exceedingly broad discretion,
not only in the immigration context but also across the regulatory
state, present a significant departure from the separation of powers
contemplated by our constitutional framers. Our constitutional text
and structure have long been understood to vest the federal
lawmaking authority exclusively in an elected Congress,126 and require
this body to submit any proposed legislation to an extensive set of
123. See Memorandum from Brian M. O’Leary, Chief Immigration Judge, Exec. Office
for Immigration Review, to All Immigration Judges, Court Administrators, Attorney
Advisors, Judicial Law Clerks, and Immigration Court Staff 3 (Mar. 7, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/03/08/13-01.pdf [https://perma.cc
/P8PV-93SM]. Both immigration agencies and federal courts have described
administrative closure as a mechanism by which an immigration judge removes a case
from the court’s active docket. Such relief does not grant the noncitizen any form of lawful
status, and prosecutors remain free to reinstate removal proceedings. See Lopez-Reyes v.
Gonzales, 496 F.3d 20, 21 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing administrative closure); Avetisyan, 25
I. & N. Dec. 688, 692, 695 (B.I.A. 2012); EOIR Notice Regarding Prosecutorial Discretion
and Administrative Closure, DEP’T. OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (July 23,
2012), https://web.archive.org/web/20160319131659/https://www.justice.gov/eoir/fact-sheetprosecutorial-discretion [https://perma.cc/EC9M-K3UG].
124. Deferred action is an administrative device allowing a variety of low-level
enforcement officers in local offices to grant an alien permission to remain and work in the
United States, typically for period of one, two, or three years. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 274a.12(c)(14) (2017); see also CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. OMBUDSMAN,
DEFERRED ACTION: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY AND
CONSISTENCY IN THE USCIS PROCESS 2 (July 11, 2011), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default
/files/publications/cisomb-combined-dar.pdf [https://perma.cc/EK9S-DD9Y]; DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., DELEGATION TO THE BUREAU OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
SERVICES 1 (Mar. 1, 2003), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=234775 [https://perma.cc/
NZ4U-WDAT] (describing authority to grant deferred action).
125. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No 109-13, § 202(c)(2)(B)(viii), 119 Stat. 302,
313 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30301 note (Minimum Document Requirements and Issuance
Standards for Federal Recognition)) (identifying deferred action status as one of the forms
of proof acceptable for federal approval of states’ issuance of driver’s licenses); Reno v.
Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 487 (1999).
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States.”); id. §§ 2–3 (specifying electoral process for membership
in House and Senate, respectively); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That
Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally
recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained
by the Constitution.”).
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procedures prior to enactment.127 The non-delegation principle, that
Congress may not delegate its lawmaking power to another body,
“represent[s] the Framers’ decision that the legislative power of the
Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.”128
These structural features promote a number of related
constitutional norms. First, by vesting the lawmaking power
exclusively in a body composed of elected officials, the nondelegation requirement ensures that those who are responsible for
enacting federal laws are subject to an electoral check.129 Second, by
requiring all proposed legislation to obtain the approval of a large and
varied number of individual actors—a majority of both the House and
the Senate, as well as the President (subject, of course, to a
supermajority veto override)—this structure mitigates the risk of
factionalism, in which the interests of a small group dominate over
the interests of the greater public, while at the same time protecting
minority interests from majoritarian oppression.130 Relatedly, these
procedures enhance the likelihood that all federal enactments have
been subject to extensive public debate and careful deliberation.131 In
these ways, the non-delegation principle serves a constellation of
norms relating to democratic accountability, individual fairness, and
efficacy. John Manning describes the constitutional goals served by
the constitutional lawmaking procedure as follows:
[I]t makes it more difficult for factions . . . to capture the
legislative process for private advantage, it promotes caution
and restrains momentary passions, it gives special protection to
the residents of small states through the states’ equal
representation in the Senate, and it generally creates a bias in
favor of filtering out bad laws by raising the decision costs of
passing any law.132
Notwithstanding these norms, immigration agencies and, indeed,
agencies across the administrative state, routinely exercise
exceedingly broad authority to promulgate national policy in
127. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
128. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
129. See U.S. CONST. art 1, §§ 1–3.
130. See Macey, supra note 13, at 819.
131. See Clark, supra note 13, at 1340–42.
132. Manning, supra note 13, at 239. For additional discussion of the constitutional
norms served by the non-delegation doctrine, see, for example, Clark, supra note 13, at
1324; (describing how federal lawmaking procedures protect separation of powers goals);
Macey, supra note 13, at 819 (describing normative goals of constitutional lawmaking
requirements).
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circumvention of the lawmaking procedures mandated by the
Constitution.
C.

The Judicial Response

The Supreme Court has been famously unwilling to enforce nondelegation requirements directly,133 but as scholars of administrative
law have noted, it has developed a series of doctrines to protect nondelegation interests indirectly, deploying both constitutional and subconstitutional frameworks to cabin the delegated discretion of
agencies across the administrative state. The application of these
doctrines to impose judicial constraints on agency discretion in the
immigration context represents a sharp departure from the plenary
power principles of the classical era, which insulated the political
branches’ immigration decisions—whether issued by Congress or
administrative officials—from judicial review.
1. Constitutional Mechanism to Limit Agency Power
The role that delegation concerns have played in the evolution of
immigration law is particularly apparent in the Supreme Court’s
decision in INS v. Chadha,134 which invalidated the one-house
legislative veto.135 That case challenged the constitutionality of the
1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, which delegated to
administrative officials the power to grant discretionary relief from
removal to an otherwise deportable alien but allowed that such a
decision could be overridden by a majority vote in either the House
or the Senate.136 While the plenary power doctrine would disavow
judicial interference with any of the political branches’ immigration
decisions, the Supreme Court in Chadha invalidated the one-house
legislative veto on the ground that it violated constitutional
lawmaking requirements:

133. The Supreme Court tolerates the delegation of much discretionary authority to
agencies: “If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which
the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not
a forbidden delegation of legislative power.” J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). It has found a violation of this exceedingly forgiving standard
only twice in its history, both during the height of the New Deal. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935) (invalidating statute delegating authority to
create “codes of fair competition”); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433
(1935) (invalidating statute delegating authority to regulate transportation of petroleum).
134. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
135. See id. at 954.
136. Id. at 923; see also Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 244(c),
66 Stat. 163, 216 (1952) (repealed 1996).
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Disagreement with the Attorney General’s decision to deport
Chadha—no less than Congress’ original choice to delegate to
the Attorney General the authority to make that decision,
involves determinations of policy that Congress can implement
in only one way; bicameral passage followed by presentment to
the President. Congress must abide by its delegation of
authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or
revoked.137
By enforcing constitutional lawmaking requirements to prevent
Congress from overriding an administrative agency’s grant of relief,
the Supreme Court departed from the plenary power principle
precluding judicial interference in immigration matters. In doing so,
the majority did not appear particularly concerned about protecting
individual rights.138 Rather, the opinion has been understood as
motivated by delegation concerns.139
To remedy the statute, the Court severed the one-house veto
provision from the remainder of the statute, thus preserving the
delegation of agency authority to grant discretionary relief.140 At first
blush, this remedy would appear to exacerbate delegation concerns
because it results in more discretionary authority to the agency than
Congress intended. Further consideration shows, however, that
Chadha in fact promotes non-delegation norms. By striking down the
one-house legislative veto, the Court created incentives for future
legislators to limit the scope of authority they would be willing to
grant to agencies ex ante because they would no longer be permitted
to override agency decisions ex post. As Jonathan Macey explains,
“the legislative veto . . . made it easier for Congress to effectuate
broad, unconstitutional delegations of authority to administrative
agencies. Declaring the legislative veto unconstitutional makes it
more costly for Congress to make broad delegations of power . . . .”141
In this way, Chadha may properly be understood to respond to
delegation concerns.
2. Sub-Constitutional Mechanisms to Limit Agency Power
The role played by delegation concerns in the evolution of
immigration jurisprudence is further evident in cases subjecting
137. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954–55.
138. Cf. id. at 966 (Powell, J., concurring) (discussing incursion on judicial power to
protect individual rights).
139. See Macey, supra note 13, at 823.
140. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959.
141. Macey, supra note 13, at 825.
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immigration decisions to sub-constitutional administrative law rules
designed to cabin the growing power of agencies across the regulatory
state. Administrative law scholars have shown how various
administrative law doctrines serve non-delegation goals by ensuring
that agency decisions conform to the norms of political accountability,
deliberation, and fairness that the constitutional lawmaking
requirements were designed to protect.142 Far from deferring to
immigration decisions under the plenary power principles, courts
routinely apply these ordinary administrative law rules to exercise
meaningful scrutiny in immigration cases.
a)

The Mid-Twentieth Century

During the 1950s, even while the Court in Knauff and Mezei
extended plenary power principles to shield the immigration decisions
of agency officials, in two other cases it granted review over, and
indeed went on to reverse such decisions. In Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath,143 a noncitizen challenged her removal on the ground that
the immigration inspector who ordered her deportation not only
adjudicated removals, but also prosecuted them.144 Sustaining the
claim, the Supreme Court held that immigration proceedings were
subject to the recently enacted Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”), which prohibited such mixing of prosecutorial and
adjudicative functions.145 Rejecting the government’s contention that
immigration proceedings are unique, the Supreme Court held they
were subject to the same disciplining constraints that the APA
imposed on all agencies.146
142. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 13, at 223–24 (discussing influence of nondelegation norms on doctrines of administrative deference); Metzger, supra note 15, at 484
(arguing that non-delegation concerns animate much of contemporary administrative law);
Michaels, supra note 15, at 520; Stack, supra note 15, at 981–82 (discussing non-delegation
norms promoted by administrative law doctrine announced in Chenery I); Sunstein, supra
note 15, at 315–16 (identifying canons of statutory construction that substitute for underenforcement of non-delegation doctrine). Congressional enactment of the Administrative
Procedure Act in 1934 was explicitly animated by a desire to develop checks and balances
on agency decisionmaking by strengthening provisions for judicial review. See Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 848 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[T]he sine qua non of the
APA was to alter inherited judicial reluctance to constrain the exercise of discretionary
administrative power—to rationalize and make fairer the exercise of such discretion”).
143. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
144. Id. at 35.
145. Id. at 35 n.1, 51; see also Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60
Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 702–06 (2016)).
146. Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 53. Congress immediately enacted legislation
making clear that deportation proceedings were not subject to APA procedural
requirements. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 306 (1955) (noting congressional

96 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2017)

106

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

The Court went further in United States ex rel. Accardi v.
Shaughnessy,147 vacating a denial of discretionary relief by generating
a new judge-made rule, now known as the Accardi principle.148 In that
case, the BIA denied Accardi’s request for “suspension of
deportation,” a form of discretionary relief that would have allowed
him to remain in the United States notwithstanding his prior unlawful
entry.149 Congress had delegated authority to grant such relief to the
Attorney General, who in turn enacted regulations vesting this
authority with the BIA.150 Although the regulations preserved the
Attorney General’s ultimate discretion to overturn the BIA’s
decisions, Accardi claimed that the Attorney General violated his
own regulations when he identified Accardi on a list of “unsavory
characters” circulated to administrative officials while his removal
proceedings were pending, precluding the Board’s fair and
independent consideration of his claim for relief.151 The Supreme
Court agreed, concluding that by promulgating regulations
contemplating that the Board would “exercise its own judgment when
considering appeals, . . . the Attorney General denie[d] himself the
right to sidestep the Board or dictate its decision in any manner.”152 In
other words, although the statute delegated to the Attorney General
discretion to grant or deny relief, the Attorney General was bound by
his own regulations limiting his ability to do so. In Accardi, now
famous for the foundational principle—generic to administrative
law—that an agency is bound by its own discretionary regulations, the
Court proved willing to impose limits on administrative immigration
decisions beyond those developed by Congress itself.
b)

Modern Cases

Today, federal courts routinely employ generally applicable
administrative law rules to closely scrutinize, and oftentimes reject,
immigration decisions. These modern cases underscore the extent to
which concerns about agencies’ political accountability, deliberation,
rationality, and fairness have supplanted the classical-era notion of
immigration exceptionalism. The 2009 decision in Negusie v.

passage of appropriations bill six months after Wong Yang Sung to exempt deportation
proceedings from APA procedural requirements).
147. 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
148. Id. at 268.
149. Id. at 261.
150. Id. at 262–63.
151. Id. at 264.
152. Id. at 266–67.
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Holder,153 vacating an administrative denial of asylum, is instructive.154
In that case, the BIA denied asylum to a noncitizen pursuant to a
statutory provision disqualifying individuals who “participated in the
persecution” of others.155 The applicant argued that his participation
in such persecution was coerced, but the BIA denied relief, relying on
judicial precedent interpreting a different statutory provision to
conclude that the bar on past persecutors applied even in cases of
coercion.156
On review, the Supreme Court held that the BIA had relied on
the earlier judicial precedent in error.157 But rather than affirming on
other grounds, such as the fact that the agency retained unfettered
discretion to deny asylum even to aliens who satisfy the statutory
criteria, the Court applied the rule developed in Securities Exchange
Commission v. Chenery (Chenery I)158 to vacate and remand.159
Chenery I established the fundamental administrative law
principle that a court must evaluate an agency’s decision based on the
rationales it provided at the time of the decision; it may not sustain a
decision that relied on faulty grounds, even if the decision might fully
be justified on other grounds.160 The requirement that an agency
supply a contemporaneous reasoned explanation for its decision
exerts a powerful disciplinary force on the administrative
decisionmaking process.161 As Kevin Stack has pointed out, Chenery
I’s prohibition against post-hoc justifications promotes norms of
deliberation by requiring agencies to engage in reasoned

153. 555 U.S. 511 (2009).
154. See id. at 513–14.
155. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
156. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 514.
157. Id.
158. 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
159. See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 522–23.
160. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 87. Chenery I involved the SEC’s exercise of its delegated
authority to reject corporate restructurings that were not “fair and equitable” or were
“detrimental to the public interest.” Id. at 90. The SEC required, as a condition of its
approval of one public utility’s restructuring proposal, that managing shareholders of the
company surrender shares they had purchased during the reorganization. Id. at 81.
Initially, the SEC justified its decision on the ground that judicial precedent precluded
such purchases. Id. at 87. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, however, the
SEC conceded that its decision was not mandated by judicial precedent, but nonetheless
decided, based on its independent assessment, that such purchases in the course of a
restructuring were unfair. Id. at 85. The Supreme Court vacated the decision. Id. at 90. In
doing so, it expressly held that the SEC was entitled to find that the purchases were unfair
and thereby reject the restructuring. Id. at 91. The problem, however, was that the SEC
had not reached such a conclusion at the time it rendered its decision. Id. at 94–95.
161. See Stack, supra note 15, at 996–98.

96 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2017)

108

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

decisionmaking before they promulgate a new policy.162 Moreover, it
promotes norms of accountability by ensuring that the agency’s actual
rationales for a given policy are “exposed to the public light” and that
responsibility for the policy is laid at the feet of the officials who
actually made the decision.163 By imposing requirements for
deliberation and accountability on immigration decisions, the Court’s
application of Chenery I to vacate an asylum decision can be
understood as an attempt to mitigate the delegation concerns raised
by administrative policymaking.
The Supreme Court has been particularly active in employing
administrative law rules to exercise review over, and ultimately
circumscribe, agency discretion to deport legal permanent residents
with criminal convictions,164 an area in which administrative officials
exercise particularly expansive discretion.165 In Judulang v. Holder,
the Court applied the doctrine of “hard look” review announced in
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.166 to closely scrutinize, and ultimately vacate, the
deportation order.167 In State Farm, the Court held that a reviewing
court must set aside an agency action as “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” under
the APA168 any time the agency
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before [it], or is so implausible that it

162. See id.
163. See id. at 993–96.
164. See Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1984 (2015) (rejecting deportation of alien
who had hidden pills in a sock); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1682 (2013)
(reversing BIA conclusion that conviction for “social sharing of a small amount of
marijuana” disqualifies deportable alien from discretionary relief); Judulang v. Holder,
565 U.S. 42, 45 (2011); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 566 (2010) (vacating
BIA decision that second conviction of simple drug possession disqualifies deportable
alien from discretionary relief); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 50 (2006) (vacating BIA
decision that conviction for aiding and abetting possession of cocaine disqualifies
deportable alien from discretionary relief).
165. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
166. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
167. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 52–53; see also Jeffrey D. Stein, Delineating Discretion: How
Judulang Limits Executive Immigration Policy-Making Authority and Opens Channels for
Future Challenges, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 35, 57 (2012) (characterizing Judulang as an
unremarkable application of ordinary administrative law rules).
168. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 29 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012)).
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could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise.169
In doing so, the Court imposed a standard of review far less
deferential to an agency’s substantive policy choice than the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard provided by statute. Gillian
Metzger has characterized this reduction in deference as reflective of
a broader skepticism toward agency decisions, resulting from a
“dramatic expansion in regulatory authority” coupled with an
“increasing loss of faith in administrative expertise.”170
The Court echoed these concerns in Judulang, applying “hard
look” review to reject the BIA’s denial of relief under now-repealed
section 212(c), which allowed discretionary grants of relief to aliens
removable on the basis of certain criminal convictions.171 Although
section 212(c) by its own terms applies only to “excludable” aliens—
i.e., aliens who entered the United States without inspection—the
Board’s longstanding practice was to extend section 212(c) relief as
well to “deportable” aliens including longtime legal residents like as
Judulang, who became removable after a formal admission.172
The statutory categories of crime-based excludability are not
identical to those for crime-based deportability, however. To resolve
this discrepancy, the BIA adopted a “comparable-grounds” approach,
allowing a deportable alien to be eligible for section 212(c) relief only
if he or she was charged with a category of crime corresponding with
one of the categories of excludable crimes listed in section 212(c).173
On review, the Court relied on State Farm to reject the use of the
comparable grounds approach as follows:
[C]ourts retain a role, and an important one, in ensuring that
agencies have engaged in reasoned decisionmaking. . . . That
task involves examining the reasons for agency decisions—or,
as the case may be, the absence of such reasons. . . . The BIA
has flunked that test here. By hinging a deportable alien’s
eligibility for discretionary relief on the chance correspondence
between statutory categories—a matter irrelevant to the alien’s
169. Id. at 43.
170. Metzger, supra note 15, at 491–92.
171. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 45–46.
172. Id. at 46–47.
173. Id. at 49. Judulang’s crime, manslaughter, fell within the deportability category of
a “crime of violence,” and he was charged with removability on this ground. Id. at 56. Had
he been seeking initial entry, his crime would have been classified as a “crime involving
moral turpitude,” an excludability ground eligible for section 212(c) relief. Id. at 54. But
because a “crime of violence” does not correspond with any of the excludability grounds,
the BIA concluded he was ineligible for section 212(c) relief. Id. at 56.
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fitness to reside in this country—the BIA has failed to exercise
its discretion in a reasoned manner.174
This demand for a better-reasoned decision from the Board departs
sharply from the deference to political branches contemplated under
plenary power principles.
At the same time, Judulang did not go so far as to deny plenary
power to Congress. On the contrary, the Court emphasized the
distinction between the immigration authority of the legislature and
that of agencies, stating “the case would be different if Congress had
intended § 212(c) relief to depend on the interaction of exclusion
grounds and deportation grounds.”175 Emphasizing the heightened
risk of arbitrariness inherent in administrative, as opposed to
congressional, decisionmaking, the Court observed:
[U]nderneath this layer of arbitrariness lies yet another,
because the outcome of the Board’s comparable-grounds
analysis itself may rest on the happenstance of an immigration
official’s charging decision. . . . So at base everything hangs on
the fortuity of an individual official’s decision. An alien
appearing before one official may suffer deportation; an
identically situated alien appearing before another may gain the
right to stay in this country.176
The rigorous scrutiny applied in Judulang thus reflects a particular
concern about the power of agency officials, even while preserving
deference to Congress with respect to immigration decisionmaking.
The Supreme Court has also relied on recent changes to the
Chevron doctrine to deny deference to decisions to deport legal
residents on the basis of criminal convictions. In Chevron, U.S.A. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council,177 the Court famously announced
its two-step framework for reviewing agencies’ interpretations of
statutes they are charged with administering.178 At the first step,
courts determine whether Congress has spoken on the issue.179 If the
statutory language is silent or ambiguous, courts proceed to the

174. Id. at 53.
175. Id. at 56 n.9.
176. Id. at 58.
177. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
178. See id. at 842–43.
179. At this first step, courts are directed to employ the “traditional tools of statutory
construction” to determine whether “Congress had an intention on the precise question at
issue.” Id. at 843 n.9.
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second step of the inquiry, in which they must defer to the agency’s
interpretation so long as it was reasonable.180
The Chevron doctrine has evolved considerably since it was first
announced, however, narrowing the circumstances under which a
reviewing court will defer to an agency. In Food and Drug
Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,181 the FDA
concluded that tobacco products fall within the statutory meaning of
“drugs” subject to the agency’s regulation.182 On review, the Court
declined to defer to the agency’s conclusion that the term “drug”
encompassed tobacco products.183 In doing so, it suggested that, a
reviewing court may deny Chevron deference to agencies even in
cases of statutory ambiguity, where the agency decision would result
in a policy change of significant “economic and political
magnitude.”184 John Manning has characterized the Brown &
Williamson decision as “reflect[ing] an evident desire to avoid
otherwise serious nondelegation concerns,” by ensuring that
Congress, rather than an agency, accepted responsibility for
important policy decisions.185 This decision and others denying
Chevron deference to agencies signal a growing distrust of agency
policymaking and corresponding willingness to exercise meaningful
judicial scrutiny to constrain it.186
180. Id. at 843. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical
Study of Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1998)
(surveying the Chevron doctrine in practice).
181. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
182. Id. at 125.
183. Id. at 125–26.
184. Id. at 133.
185. Manning, supra note 13, at 227–28.
186. The Supreme Court retreated further from Chevron’s principle of administrative
deference in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), holding that only
formalized agency decisions, such as those made pursuant to formal adjudication or
notice-and-comment rulemaking, are entitled to Chevron deference; other types of agency
decisions are subject to the more exacting judicial scrutiny described in Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Mead, 533 U.S. at 221, 226–27 (providing that agency decision
entitled only to level of “respect according to its persuasiveness” (citing Skidmore, 323
U.S. 134, 140)). Mead, like Brown & Williamson, promotes non-delegation norms by
offering Chevron deference as a reward for agencies employing procedural mechanisms
that ensure some degree of public participation and require the agency to engage in
extensive deliberation and reason-giving. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 886 (2001) (noting that reserving Chevron deference
to decisions made pursuant to formal procedures “provides important assurance that
interpretations entitled to mandatory deference will be open to public criticism before
they are rendered, and agencies will have incentives to be responsive to these criticism”);
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 539–40 (2003) (noting that Mead promotes
consistency and uniformity in decisionmaking); see also Michigan v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2699,
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The Court has employed this gloss on the Chevron doctrine in
the immigration context to limit agencies’ power to deport legal
residents on the basis of criminal convictions on several occasions.
Just this past term, Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions187 used this
approach to deny Chevron deference to the BIA.188 EsquivelQuintana had been convicted of statutory rape under California law,
which defines the crime as consensual intercourse with a minor who is
more than three years younger than the perpetrator.189 The BIA
concluded that such as crime constituted “sexual abuse of a minor”
within the meaning of the INA’s deportability provisions and
accordingly ordered Esquivel-Quintana deported. Vacating that
order, the Supreme Court concluded that term “sexual abuse of a
minor . . . unambiguously” excludes convictions for statutory rape
unless the state law under which the alien is convicted limits the
definition of that crime to cases involving victims younger than
sixteen years old.190 This willingness to mandate a judicial
construction wholly untethered from the statutory text reveals a deep
discomfort with the breadth of discretion exercised by agency officials
in determining when legal residents can be deported on the basis of
criminal convictions.
Mellouli v. Lynch191 presents another example of the Court’s
willingness to limit the agency’s discretion to deport residents on the
basis of criminal convictions. Mellouli pled “guilty to a misdemeanor
offense under Kansas law,” which prohibits the use of drug
paraphernalia to store or conceal a controlled substance after he was
found hiding four Adderall tablets in his sock.192 The BIA ordered
him removed pursuant to section 237 of the INA, which provides for
the deportation of any alien “convicted of a violation of . . . any law or
regulation of a State . . . relating to a controlled substance (as defined
in § 802 of Title 21).”193 The referenced provision, 21 U.S.C. § 802,
defines “controlled substance” as including only those drugs listed in
one of five federal schedules.194 The BIA in earlier cases had held that
2707–08 (2015) (purporting to apply Chevron deference to agency interpretation of
statutory authority to impose “appropriate and necessary” regulations but concluding that
interpretation that precludes consideration of cost in regulation unreasonable).
187. 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017).
188. Id. at 1572.
189. Id. at 1567.
190. Id. at 1572.
191. 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015).
192. Id. at 1983.
193. See id. at 1983–84 (first omission in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)
(2012)).
194. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (2012).
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conviction under a state law prohibiting drug possession or
distribution would trigger deportation under this provision only if the
state law was limited to the controlled substances included in the
federal definition.195 It subsequently held, however, that a state law
conviction for using drug paraphernalia triggered deportation
regardless of any correspondence between the state law and federal
definitions of a “controlled substance.”196 The definition of
“controlled substance” under Kansas law is broader than the federal
definition of that term.197 But because Mellouli had a conviction for
drug paraphernalia rather than for possession or distribution, the BIA
concluded that the overbreadth of Kansas’s definition of “controlled
substance” posed no obstacle to his deportability.198
On review, the Supreme Court summarily denied Chevron
deference to the agency’s construction of the statute.199 As in
Esquivel-Quintana, the Court placed little reliance on the statutory
text, rejecting the BIA’s interpretation on the ground that it “ma[d]e
scant sense,” producing the “anomalous result that minor
paraphernalia possession offenses are treated more harshly than drug
possession and distribution offenses.”200
Mellouli thus conforms to a larger pattern. Far from extending
“plenary” deference to administrative decisions relating to the
exclusion, detention, or deportation of aliens, the modern Court has
repeatedly applied ordinary administrative law rules to deny any
deference at all.
* * *
These cases contextualize the retreat from plenary power
principles within a larger administrative law project to constrain the
scope of discretion delegated to unelected agency officials. As such,
they suggest that contemporary standards of judicial review over
immigration cases may owe as much to concerns about administrative
power as to any concern for noncitizens’ individual rights. Indeed,
some of these cases appear to disavow concern for the individual
alien’s interest altogether by expressly declining to rely on any
“immigration rule of lenity,” a doctrine directing courts to construe
statutes in favor of noncitizens faced with removal.201
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See, e.g., Paulus, 11 I. & N. Dec. 274, 276 (B.I.A. 1965).
See Martinez Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec. 118, 122 (B.I.A. 2009).
See Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1985.
See id. at 1988.
Id. at 1989.
Id.
In 1948, the Court in Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948), held:
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Of course, any given judicial decision may be motivated by a
multitude of concerns, and a non-delegation theory need not be
mutually exclusive from an individual-rights theory. Rather, it is
entirely plausible that concerns relating to both individual rights and
the expanding scope of agency power have played a role in the retreat
from plenary power principles in immigration law. After all, it is not
as though the Supreme Court has been entirely blind to the
implications of its decisions on non-citizens’ rights.202 In Judulang, for
example, the Court emphasized the “high stakes for an alien who has
long resided in this country” in rejecting the agency’s decision.203 In
Zadvydas, the Court held that the alien’s constitutional due process
interests required it to read the detention statute narrowly.204 And the

We resolve the doubts in favor of [the] construction [favoring aliens] because
deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or
exile. It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in this country. Such a
forfeiture is a penalty. To construe this statutory provision less generously to the
alien might find support in logic. But since the stakes are considerable for the
individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom
beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the
words used.
Id. at 10 (citation omitted). For a discussion of the rule of lenity in the immigration
context, see David S. Rubenstein, Putting the Immigration Rule of Lenity in its Proper
Place: A Tool of Last Resort After Chevron, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 491–94 (2007); Brian
G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
515, 519–28 (2003).
202. In the distinct but related area of citizenship, the Court has relied more explicitly
on an individual-rights theory to reject the government’s decisionmaking. See Sessions v.
Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1697–98 (2017) (applying ordinary equal protection
analysis to invalidate use of gender classification in determining citizenship based on
parentage but distinguishing from cases involving use of such classifications in determining
alien admissions).
Even in citizenship cases, however, the Court has expressed concern about the scope
of discretionary authority delegated to agency officials. Such concerns were apparent in
the majority’s recent opinion in Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017),
involving an individual stripped of citizenship pursuant to a statute allowing for the
denaturalization of an individual convicted of procuring naturalization through false
statements. Id. at 1923–24. Although the agency had interpreted the statute as allowing
revocation regardless of the false statement’s materiality, the Court unanimously
concluded that the statute requires a causal connection between the false statement and
the conferral of citizenship. Id. at 1925. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Sotomayor’s
opinion for six Justices expressed particular concern about the breadth of discretionary
authority, noting that the government’s interpretation “would give prosecutors nearly
limitless leverage—and afford newly naturalized Americans precious little security” and
concluding that “[t]he defendant in a 1425(a) case should neither benefit nor suffer from a
wayward official’s deviations from legal requirements.” Id. at 1927–28.
203. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 58 (2011).
204. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001).
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Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky205 squarely employed an
individual-rights analysis to hold that noncitizens are constitutionally
entitled to reasonable legal advice regarding the immigration
consequences of criminal convictions.206 Nonetheless, understanding
the Court’s retreat from plenary power as driven at least in part by
delegation concerns helps explain one of the central puzzles in
contemporary immigration law—why courts defer to immigration
decisions in some cases but not others.
D. Explaining the Persistence of Plenary Power
A retreat from plenary power principles rooted in delegation
concerns suggests that courts have not necessarily rejected the
plenary power doctrine outright but have instead concluded that such
authority is not freely delegable to unelected agency officials. This
understanding helps resolve a number of seeming inconsistencies in
contemporary immigration law. In a variety of contexts, courts have
retreated from plenary power principles to reject certain types of
decisions made by an immigration agency. Yet they have extended
plenary deference to similar types of decisions when made directly by
Congress or even the President. It is important to note here that the
Supreme Court has stated that, unlike in ordinary domestic
regulatory contexts, both the President and Congress share inherent
authority to regulate immigration, that is, presidential authority over
immigration is not limited to that delegated by Congress.207 The
principle that both Congress and the President retain plenary power
to regulate immigration, but that neither may delegate this unfettered
discretion to agency officials, helps explain apparent contradictions in
immigration cases involving immigrant detention, sexual orientation,
procedural rights, and national origin discrimination.

205. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
206. See id. at 366. Even Padilla, arguably the strongest support for the conventional
individual-rights thesis, may be understood in part as a response to a shift in the locus of
immigration decisionmaking authority away from the judiciary in favor of administrative
officials. Historically, sentencing judges in criminal courts exercised authority to issue
“judicial recommendations against deportation,” binding on the nation’s immigration
agencies. Id. at 361–62. But then Congress circumscribed this provision in 1952 and
eliminated it altogether in 1990, so that today, immigration officials rather than criminal
judges exercise exclusive authority to determine the immigration consequences of any
criminal conviction. Id. at 363–64. The Padilla majority’s emphasis on these statutory
changes suggests that the decision was at least partly motivated by a desire to reassert
judicial control over deportation decisions. See id. at 361–64.
207. See Kim, supra note 93, at 711.
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1. Immigrant Detention
The non-delegation theory clarifies the ongoing vitality of
plenary power principles in determining the scope of review over
immigrant detention. In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court
discarded plenary power principles to invalidate the indefinite
detention of aliens.208 Yet only two years later in Demore v. Kim, the
Supreme Court applied plenary power to sustain the mandatory
detention of aliens.209 The key to understanding the invocation of
plenary power principles in Kim but not in Zadvydas lies in the
identity of the institutional actor making the detention decision. In
Zadvydas, the detention decision required the intervening
discretionary judgment of an unelected agency official, while in Kim,
the decision was made by Congress directly.210
In Zadvydas, the Court reviewed a due process challenge
brought by an alien who had been adjudicated deportable but
remained in detention because no other country was willing to accept
him.211 Congress delegated to the agency the authority to detain an
individual beyond the 90-day period in which removal is typically
effectuated.212 In light of the “serious constitutional concerns”
implicated by an alien’s indefinite detention, however, the Court
imposed a presumptive six-month limitation to such detention, a
remedy wholly untethered from the statutory text.213 In doing so, the
Court emphasized, “the Constitution may well preclude granting ‘an
administrative body the unreviewable authority to make
determinations implicating fundamental rights.’”214 In this manner,
the Court underscored the need for constraints on administrative
exercises of delegated discretion.
In Demore v. Kim, respondent raised a due process challenge to
a different detention provision, also enacted in 1996, which mandated
detention without bail for certain aliens pending their removal
proceedings.215 Rejecting the challenge, the Court applied the plenary
power doctrine, affirming that “[i]n the exercise of its broad power
over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules

208. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682.
209. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516 (2003).
210. See id. at 513; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 683.
211. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–85.
212. See id. at 682, 701.
213. See id. at 692.
214. Id. (quoting Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 450
(1985)).
215. See Kim, 538 U.S. at 513–14.
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that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”216 Unlike in
Zadvydas, the detention decision in Kim originated directly from
Congress; indeed, Congress added the mandatory detention provision
to eliminate the discretion of administrative officials to release aliens
on bail pending their removal proceedings.217 Where the detention
decision stemmed from Congress rather than agency officials, the
Court applied the plenary power doctrine to sustain the detention.
2. Sexual Orientation
The non-delegation theory of plenary power similarly helps
explain a pair of earlier cases involving the deportation of noncitizens
on the basis of sexual orientation. In both Rosenberg v. Fleuti218 and
Boutilier v. INS,219 a statutory provision barring any alien “afflicted
with a psychopathic personality” had been applied to exclude gay
men from the United States.220 The Court rejected the alien’s
exclusion in Fleuti but four years later sustained it in Boutilier.221 A
focus on delegation concerns helps resolve this apparent
inconsistency.
In Fleuti, where the application of the statutory provision
depended on the discretionary judgment of an agency official, the
Court intervened. Fleuti was admitted as a legal permanent resident
into the United States before the “psychopathic personality”
provision came into effect.222 The terms of the statute denied “entry”
to covered individuals but did not affect aliens already within the
United States.223 Years later Fleuti crossed the Mexican border for a
brief trip of “about a couple hours.”224 On his return, agency officials
concluded that he was seeking “entry” into the United States and
applied the newly enacted bar to exclude him.225 The Supreme Court
rejected the exclusion, holding that the agency improperly applied the
statute to Fleuti because a legal resident returning to the United
States after “an innocent, casual, and brief” trip abroad is not deemed
to be seeking “entry” within the meaning of the statute.226
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 521 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976)).
See id. at 520–21.
374 U.S. 449 (1963).
387 U.S. 118 (1967).
Id. at 118 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1964)); Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 450–51 (same).
See Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 119; Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 463.
Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 453.
Id. at 452–53.
Id. at 450.
See id. at 450, 452.
Id. at 462.
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Four years later in Boutilier, however, where the exclusion
decision was directed by Congress itself, the Court adhered to plenary
power principles to sustain it. Unlike Fleuti, Boutilier’s initial entry
into the United States clearly post-dated the enactment of the new
entry restriction.227 He argued, however, that the excludability bar
was void for vagueness as applied to him.228 Rejecting the challenge,
the Court noted that “[t]he legislative history of the Act indicates
beyond a shadow of a doubt that Congress intended the phrase
‘psychopathic personality’ to include homosexuals such as
petitioner.”229 Squarely confronted with the question of Congress’s
power to exclude aliens on the basis of sexual orientation, the Court
proved unwilling to delimit it.230 These comparisons of cases
demonstrate that while the Court may impose meaningful judicial
constraints on the immigration decisions of federal agencies, it is far
less willing to do so with respect to decisions by Congress.
3. Procedural Rights of Refugees
Inconsistencies in the procedural rights afforded to refugees can
also be understood when viewed from a non-delegation perspective.
In accordance with international treaty obligations,231 Congress
enacted what is known as the “withholding of removal” provision in
the Refugee Act of 1980 which provided: “The Attorney General
shall not deport or return any alien . . . to a country if the Attorney
General determines that such alien’s life or freedom would be
threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”232
Grants of withholding, unlike grants of asylum, are not discretionary;

227. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 118–19 (1967).
228. Id. at 120
229. See id.
230. See id. at 123–24.
231. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees arts. 1, 33, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
232. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, sec. 203(e), §243(h)(1), 94 Stat. 102, 107
(repealed 1996). A substantially similar provision was enacted at the time of repeal. Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, sec.
305(a)(3) § 241(b)(3)(A), 110 Stat. 3009-546, at 3009-602 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A) (2012)) (“[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if
the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that
country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.”).
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an individual who satisfies the threshold showing is legally entitled to
withholding.233
Lower courts have repeatedly rejected attempts by
administrative agencies to deny procedural protections to noncitizens
pursuant to this provision. In Maldonado-Perez v. INS,234 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a noncitizen is legally
entitled to an evidentiary hearing to show that repatriation would
threaten his or her life or freedom.235 The Second Circuit went further
in Augustin v. Sava236 to vest aliens with a right to translation services
during such hearings.237 And in Selgeka v. Carroll,238 the Fourth
Circuit rejected the agency’s attempt to provide stowaways with only
an informal interview before an INS officer as opposed to a full
hearing before an Immigration Judge.239
Yet, the Supreme Court has denied any such procedural
protections where repatriation without hearing was ordered by the
President himself. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, discussed in
Section I.B.1, was decided in the context of a humanitarian crisis
beginning in the 1970s, in which political and economic turmoil in
Haiti caused tens of thousands to flee for the United States, often on
unseaworthy vessels.240 Although many had valid claims for
withholding of removal, the sheer volume of migrants exceeded the
government’s capacity to process their claims.241 In response,
President Bush issued an Executive Order directing the Coast Guard
to forcibly repatriate migrants found on the high seas without any
process for screening aliens for valid claims of persecution.242
Deferring to the President’s decision to deny procedural protections
for withholding claims, the Court stated: “We cannot say that the
interdiction program created by the President . . . usurped authority
that Congress had delegated to, or implicated responsibilities that it
had imposed on, the Attorney General alone.”243 The President,
233. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2012) (withholding provision), with id.
§ 1158(b)(1)(A) (asylum provision). In INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), the
Supreme Court held that withholding of removal requires the noncitizen to establish a
higher likelihood of persecution than asylum. Id. at 429.
234. 865 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
235. Id. at 332.
236. 735 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1984).
237. Id. at 37.
238. 184 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1999).
239. Id. at 345.
240. Sale v. Hatian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155,160–64 (1993)
241. Id. at 163.
242. Id. at 164.
243. Id. at 172.
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exercising inherent authority to regulate immigration rather than
power delegated by Congress, was thus free to deny even the
truncated hearings that agencies were judicially mandated to
provide.244
4. Nationality Classifications
Distinctions based on nationality present particularly thorny
questions in immigration law. Such distinctions are presumed to be
invidious and thus impermissible in almost every other context.245 Yet
they arguably inhere in the very notion of an immigration system,
premised as it is on a distinction between United States citizens versus
noncitizens. Moreover, nationality distinctions among non-U.S.
citizens are deeply rooted in historical practice, evident not only in
the Chinese Exclusion Acts, but indeed the preceding laws
implementing an immigration policy favoring Chinese immigrants, as
negotiated through a bilateral treaty with the Emperor of China.246
Even today, nationality classifications are pervasive in our
immigration system. For example, the visa waiver program allows
nationals of some countries to visit the United States without first
obtaining a visa, while requiring nationals of other countries to apply
for a visa at a U.S. consular office before traveling to the United
States.247 Uniform per-country ceiling limits on immigrant admissions
require nationals of Mexico or the Philippines to wait ten to fourteen
years longer than applicants from other countries for certain
categories of visas.248 The Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on

244. Sale differed from the other cases involving withholding procedures in another
important respect: the claimants in Sale never reached the territorial United States. Id. at
162–63. The extraterritorial nature of the claim as well as the identity of the
decisionmaker—the President rather than agency officials—virtually ensured the Court’s
refusal to intervene. See id. at 188.
245. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (noting that “the Court’s
decisions have established that classifications based on alienage, like those based on
nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny” (footnotes
omitted)).
246. See Additional Articles to the Treaty Between the United States of America and
the Ta-Tsing Empire (Burlingame Treaty), China-U.S., art. V, July 28, 1868, 16 Stat. 739.
247. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a), (c) (2012). The program currently exempts nationals of
thirty-eight countries from visa requirements. Visa Waiver Program, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/visit/visa-waiver-program.html [https://perma.cc/6SHPDT3X]. In addition, nationals of Canada and Mexico may enter the United States without
a visa. 8 C.F.R. § 212.6(a), (b) (2017).
248. Pursuant to the per-country visa ceiling limits imposed by section 202 of the INA,
an applicant from Mexico can wait fourteen years longer than other applicants for the
same type of visa; another type of visa requires Filipinos to wait ten years longer than
other applicants. See, e.g., BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, VISA
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the constitutionality of nationality classifications in immigration law
since the Chinese Exclusion era. In modern times, the permissibility
of such distinctions, presumed to be invidious in other contexts, has
been unclear. Courts appear to be struggling with the circumstances
under which distinctions on the basis of nationality should be
tolerated in immigration law. Nonetheless, the non-delegation theory
underscores one important variable influencing judicial willingness to
tolerate such classifications: the identity of the government actor.
Courts have generally been skeptical toward the use of
nationality classifications where they are a result of an administrative
exercise of delegated power. The Supreme Court’s decision in Jean v.
Nelson,249 while declining to issue a direct constitutional ruling,
suggested a deep reluctance to vest agencies with plenary power to
discriminate on this basis.250 That case involved the INS’s exercise of
delegated discretion to grant parole to aliens arriving into the United
States who would otherwise be subject to detention pending removal
proceedings.251 Although the agency historically opted in favor of
granting parole to aliens arriving on our nation’s shores without
documentation, it changed course in 1981 in response to the influx of
Haitian and Cuban migrants sailing to South Florida, implementing a
new policy of detaining rather than releasing such aliens.252
In Jean, a group of Black Haitian migrants challenged the new
policy, alleging that it discriminated against them on the basis of race
and nationality.253 The lower court rejected this claim, reasoning that
“the grant of discretionary authority to the Attorney General . . .

BULLETIN 2 (Nov. 2016) https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Bulletins/visabulletin
_November2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8WZ-D5HV] The wait-times for each visa
category, by nationality, are provided on a monthly basis by the State Department. See
Visa Bulletin, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/law-andpolicy/bulletin.html [https://perma.cc/B7TJ-FN4X]; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(2)
(allowing per-country visa quotas).
249. 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
250. Id. at 857.
251. Id. at 848 (“[INA section 212] authorizes the Attorney General ‘in his discretion’
to parole into the United States any such alien applying for admission ‘under such
conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the
public interest.’” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)(1982)).
252. See id. at 848–49.
253. The Court appeared to use the terms “nationality” and “national-origin”
interchangeably. See id. at 856–57. But see id. at 863–64 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting
distinction between national origin and nationality). See generally Liav Orgad & Theodore
Ruthizer, Race, Religion and Nationality in Immigration Selection 20 Years After the
Chinese Exclusion Case, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 237, 247 (2010) (using term “nationality to
include two concepts: the first refers to one’s country of birth or of current citizenship. The
second refers to one’s national or ethnic origins, regardless of citizenship.”).
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permit[s] the Executive to discriminate on the basis of national origin
in making parole decisions.”254 On appeal, however, the Supreme
Court reversed, concluding that the lower court improperly reached
the constitutional question.255 Instead, it employed the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance to impose a textually untethered limit to
discretionary grants of parole, concluding that both the relevant
statute as well as the Attorney General’s regulations prohibited
considerations of race or nationality in parole determinations.256 It
concluded:
This case does not implicate the authority of Congress, the
President, or the Attorney General. Rather, it challenges the
power of low-level politically unresponsive government officials
to act in a manner which is contrary to federal statutes . . . and
the directions of the President and the Attorney General, both
of whom provided for a policy of non-discriminatory
enforcement.257
This decision is noteworthy for several reasons. First, the Court
imposed a textually unsupported limit to a broad delegation of
statutory authority, concluding that Congress had not intended to
allow lower-level agency officials to exercise such authority in a
discriminatory manner. Second, the decision was careful to
distinguish the scope of discretionary authority delegated to these
lower-level officials from that of Congress and the President,
declining to issue a ruling that would limit the plenary power vested
in these constitutional heads of the political branches. In this way,
Jean v. Nelson appears more concerned with the delegation of power
to “politically unresponsive” agency officials than with the premise of
plenary power principles more generally.258
254. Jean, 472 U.S. at 852.
255. Id. at 854–55.
256. Id.; see also id. at 862–64 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (parsing statutory text to
conclude that it does not preclude agency from considering race or national origin in
parole decisions).
257. Id. at 853 (majority opinion).
258. Id.; see also Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 499 (9th Cir. 1994) (invalidating INS
officer’s decision to target aliens with Nigerian surnames); Olsen v. Albright, 990 F. Supp.
31, 38–39 (D.D.C. 1997) (rejecting consular policy of applying closer scrutiny to visa
applicants from certain nations). But see Maldonado v. Holder, 763 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir.
2014) (holding in dicta that ICE officials were permitted to target particular nationalities).
In Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, 45 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir.
1995) the D.C. Circuit concluded that a statutory prohibition against nationality
discrimination precluded the State Department from singling out Vietnamese applicants in
this manner. Id. at 473–74. After Congress intervened, however, amending the relevant
statute to expressly provide that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit the
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Consistent with this approach, lower court decisions continue to
defer to the plenary power of Congress to employ nationality
classifications in immigration law. The Fourth Circuit decision in
Appiah v. INS,259 upholding provisions of the Nicaraguan Adjustment
and Central American Relief Act granting preferential treatment to
nationals of Guatemala, El Salvador, and former Soviet bloc nations
seeking relief from removal, is typical: “Although these provisions
differentiate among aliens based on national origin, strict scrutiny
does not apply here because Congress can favor some nationalities
over others in immigration law.”260 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in
Rodriguez-Silva v. INS261 observed:
Due process does not require Congress to grant aliens from all
nations the same chances for admission to or remaining within
the United States. Congress may permissibly set immigration
criteria that are sensitive to an alien’s nationality or place of
origin. It is not for this Court to question Congress’s decisions
on such matters.262
Courts have been unwilling to intervene in such decisions, deferring
to the plenary power of Congress to regulate immigration.
Likewise, courts have deferred to nationality classifications
employed by the President himself.263 In Narenji v. Civiletti,264 the
authority of the Secretary of State to determine the procedures for the processing of
immigrant visa applications or the locations where such applications will be processed,”
the D.C. Circuit upheld the discriminatory treatment. Legal Assistance for Vietnamese
Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, 104 F.3d 1349, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
1152(a)(1) (2012)).
259. 202 F.3d 704 (4th Cir. 2000).
260. Id. at 710. Under the challenged provisions, individuals from the identified nations
would not be subject to the “stop-time” provisions for determining whether they met the
minimum time requirements for physical presence and residence. Id. at 706.
261. 242 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 2001).
262. Id. at 248; see also Sad v. INS, 246 F.3d 811, 822 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that
“Congress may favor some nationalities over others when enacting immigration laws” and
such decisions are subject to a “standard even more deferential than rational-basis
review”).
263. For assessments of the relationship between the President and administrative
agencies, see generally Bressman, supra note 186, at 515 (criticizing presidential control
over agencies for compromising good governance norms); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary
Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L.
REV. 441 (2010) (challenging notion that president should control agencies on political
accountability grounds); Kagan, supra note 88 (celebrating presidential control over
agency decisionmaking); Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1741 (2009) (arguing that presidential interference in agency decisionmaking subverts
transparency and accountability); Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative
Model of the Administrative State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1402–03 (2013) (warning
of risk that politics will completely eclipse norms of deliberation in the modern
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit applied the
plenary power doctrine to reject an equal protection challenge to a
regulation targeting Iranian nationals for special reporting
requirements.265 In doing so, the court emphasized that the regulation
had been promulgated at the direction of the President: “the present
controversy involving Iranian students in the United States lies in the
field of our country’s foreign affairs and implicates matters over
which the President has direct constitutional authority.”266 Given the
President’s personal imprimatur on the policy,267 the court declined to
restrain the explicit targeting of Iranian nationals.268
A series of cases sustaining the post-9/11 “special registration”
program departs somewhat from the general pattern, exhibiting a
willingness to extend plenary power principles to cabinet-level
officials directly below the President. Shortly after the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, the Attorney General personally announced a program
requiring categories of aliens from a list of predominantly Muslim
nations to report to immigration officials for fingerprinting and
interrogation.269 Although this program, unlike the one at issue in
Narenji, did not bear the President’s personal imprimatur, every
circuit court to review the special registration program sustained it.270
It may be that courts are willing to treat the Attorney General, a
“principal officer” appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the
President, as the functional equivalent of the President for purposes
of assessing the scope of this official’s immigration authority.271 The

administrative state); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
965, 968 (1997) (expressing concern that presidential control over rulemaking erodes
balance between law and politics); Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114
MICH. L. REV. 683 (2016) (describing ways in which administrative law tools can be used
to temper presidential control).
264. 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
265. Id at 748.
266. Id.
267. See Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65, 728 (Nov. 14, 1979).
268. See Narenji, 617 F.2d at 748.
269. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Ashcroft Announces
Implementation of the First Phase of the National Security Entry-Exit Registration
System (Aug. 12, 2002), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2002/August/02_ag
_466.htm [https://perma.cc/C8FY-GCX2].
270. See, e.g., Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 432–34 (2d Cir. 2008); Kandamar v.
Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 73–74 (1st Cir. 2006); Zafar v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 461 F.3d 1357, 1367
(11th Cir. 2006); Ali v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 678, 681 (5th Cir. 2006).
271. But see Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp.3d 591, 606–07 (S.D. Tex. 2015)
(applying ordinary administrative law principles to closely scrutinize immigration policy,
emphasizing that decision was made by the Secretary of Homeland Security rather than
the President himself), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).
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Second Circuit’s opinion in Rajah v. Mukasey272 supports this view,
emphasizing the proximity of the Attorney General to the President
even while acknowledging that judicial intervention would be
appropriate had the policy targeting particular nationalities been
made at a lower level of the executive branch.273 The special
registration cases thus suggest that the plenary power doctrine may
extend not only to shield immigration decisions of Congress and the
President, but also those made by cabinet-level officials directly
below the President. At the same time, they also confirm a reluctance
to extend plenary power principles further, to reach lower level
agency officials.
* * *
The continued judicial willingness to defer to the immigration
decisions of Congress and the President even while denying such
deference to lower-level administrative officials suggests that courts
have not necessarily rejected plenary power principles outright, but
concluded that such unreviewable power cannot be delegated to
agency officials.
The Supreme Court may provide more clarity on this issue in
connection with litigation challenges to President Trump’s efforts to
exclude noncitizens solely on the basis of nationality.274 The Court
had granted certiorari to review the validity of an earlier Executive
Order imposing such an exclusion,275 but that Order has since expired
and been replaced by a new Proclamation, issued in September
2017.276 As this Article goes to press, challenges to the Proclamation
are working their way through the lower courts and are likely to
present the Supreme Court with another opportunity to address the
scope of judicial review over presidential immigration decisions.277
272. 544 F.3d 427 (2d Cir. 2008).
273. See id. at 434–36 (“If the Program was in fact simply rogue conduct by
immigration authorities, some remedy . . . would be called for.”).
274. See Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017); Exec. Order No.
13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (revoking and replacing Exec. Order No.
13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017)).
275. See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (granting
certiorari and consolidating Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (en
banc) (4th Cir. 2017) and Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017)), vacated and
remanded, Trump v. Hawaii, __ S. Ct. __, 2017 WL 4782860, (Oct. 24, 2017) (mem.),
dismissed as moot, __ F.3d __, 2017 WL 5034677 (9th Cir. Nov. 2, 2017) and Trump v. Int’l
Refugee Assistance Project, __ S. Ct. __, 2017 WL 4518553, (Oct. 10, 2017) (mem.),
dismissed as moot, No. 17-1351 (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 2017).
276. See Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. at 45,165–68.
277. See Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17–00050, 2017 WL 4639560, at *1 (D. Hawaii, Oct. 17,
2017); Int’l Regugee Assistance Project v. Trump, Civil Action No. 17-0361, 2017 WL
4674314, at *10 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2017).

96 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2017)

126

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

III. A NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT OF A NON-DELEGATION THEORY
OF PLENARY POWER
The preceding Part developed a non-delegation theory for the
doctrinal retreat from plenary power principles, suggesting that courts
have not necessarily rejected the notion of plenary power outright,
but rather concluded that such power is not freely delegable to agency
officials. This Part presents a normative assessment of this approach.
It begins by defending judicial scrutiny over administrative
immigration decisions as consistent with the plenary power doctrine’s
theoretical underpinnings. It continues, however, by critiquing the
continued vitality of plenary power under the non-delegation theory.
A retreat from plenary power principles rooted primarily in
delegation concerns falls short of the ultimate goal of recognizing full
constitutional protections to noncitizens because it fails to constrain
the power of Congress and the President. And even where the
relevant decisionmaker is an administrative officer, a non-delegation
theory of plenary power may be as likely to reject agency decisions
favorable to noncitizens’ interests as those that harm them.
A. Defending the Denial of Plenary Power to Agency Officials
The denial of deference to administrative immigration decisions
is defensible on the plenary power doctrine’s own terms. Courts have
offered a number of rationales for vesting an unreviewable power to
regulate immigration with the political branches. The most
compelling of these are based on notions of democratic selfdetermination and the need for a uniform immigration policy, but
neither justifies extending such power to unelected administrative
officials.
The theory of plenary power—that unelected courts must defer
to the immigration decisions of the political branches—rests primarily
on a notion of democratic self-determination. In Chae Chan Ping, the
Court emphasized the “undoubted right” of “[e]very society . . . to
determine who shall compose its members,”278 apparently concluding
that the polity, as represented by the political branches, must be free
to define the terms of its membership without judicial interference.279
Whatever the merits of this claim as applied to decisions of politically

278. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 607 (1889).
279. See id. at 609 (stating that the decisions relating to the exclusion of noncitizens
“are not questions for judicial determination. If there be any just ground of complaint . . . ,
it must be made to the political department of our government, which is alone competent
to act upon the subject”).
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representative bodies, it is unpersuasive as applied to the decisions of
unelected agency officials. Legislative and even presidential decisions
reflect the will of the electorate in a way that lower-level agency
decisions simply do not.
A second rationale that has been used to defend the plenary
power doctrine is the need for a uniform policy toward foreign
nations and their citizens. As the Court in Chae Chan Ping put it,
“[f]or local interests the several States of the Union exist, but for
national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we
are but one people, one nation, one power.”280 Judicial intervention in
immigration decisions, it has been argued, would compromise
sensitive foreign relations and our nation’s ability to speak with one
voice.281 Again, this rationale translates poorly to agency
decisionmaking. The decisions of Congress and the President,
constitutionally vested with authority to regulate foreign relations, are
more likely to cohere as a national uniform policy as compared to the
decisions of various states or federal courts. The same cannot be said,
however, of the granular decisions of low-level immigration officials.
The diffusion of authority across our nation’s vast and sprawling
immigration bureaucracy precludes any claim that vesting plenary
power in agencies will improve uniformity.
There are, of course, valid reasons for courts to defer to agencies
as a general matter, including expedience, efficiency, and
administrative expertise.282 But claims that low-level agency officials
should be entrusted to exercise powers inherent in sovereignty,
should engage in sensitive foreign relations, or would be likely to
develop a uniform national policy, are not among them. The
realization that there is simply no reason to carve out immigration
officials from the legal rules generally applicable to the larger
administrative state comes as a welcome development.

280. Id. at 606.
281. See id. (“If the government of [a foreign] country . . . is dissatisfied with
[immigration decisions] it can make complaint to the executive head of our government
. . . ; and there lies its only remedy.).
282. For a defense of these values over electoral accountability, see Bressman, supra
note 186, at 516–18 (arguing that attempts to justify administrative legitimacy have
focused too much on political accountability at the expense of concerns regarding agency
arbitrariness); Criddle, supra note 263, at 470–78 (promoting view of administrative
legitimacy based on norms of deliberation and reasonableness rather than exclusively
based on electoral accountability); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v.
EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 65–67 (2008) (characterizing
recent administrative law decisions as “expertise-forcing,” reflecting judicial
disenchantment with politicization of administrative decisionmaking).
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Shortcomings of the Non-Delegation Theory

For the many who hoped that the shifts in immigration law
would ultimately lead to the recognition of full constitutional
protections for noncitizens, however, the non-delegation theory of
plenary power does not go nearly far enough. First, it continues to
deny meaningful judicial review when Congress or the President
violates noncitizens’ rights. Second, although courts may exercise
robust review over the decisions of agency officials, such review may
be as likely to reverse immigration decisions that protect aliens’
interests as those that harm them.
1. Failure to Protect Against Congress and the President
The non-delegation theory of plenary power continues to shield
immigration decisions rendered directly by Congress or the President
from meaningful judicial review. These institutional actors remain
free to exclude, detain, and deport aliens, regardless of the extent to
which such decisions violate other constitutional norms. And, while
the vast majority of immigration decisions are made by agency
officials and thus remain subject to judicial review, Congress and the
President have been responsible for some of our nation’s most
troubling immigration policies.
President Trump’s actions during his first year in office
underscore the importance of this distinction. Through a series of
executive orders, President Trump has promulgated a number of
policies posing grave threats to noncitizens’ interests. The “travel
ban,” prohibiting the entry of nationals from particular countries, is
the most prominent among these.283 Other provisions, which have
received far less public attention, include the scaling back of
procedural protections for noncitizens accused of deportability and
expansion of policies to detain noncitizens without a bond hearing
pending removal proceedings.284
It is true that the lower court decisions in the travel ban cases
suggest a willingness to impose judicial checks on the President’s
immigration power. In those cases, courts have held that individualrights concerns preclude even the President from making immigration
decisions based on religion or arbitrary nationality classifications.285
283. See Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017); Exec. Order No.
13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (revoking and replacing Exec. Order No.
13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017), and prohibiting entry).
284. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017).
285. Lower court decisions reviewing the first version of the travel ban include
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1164–66 (9th Cir. 2017); Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp.
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Those decisions, however, relied on explicit statements made by
President Trump himself expressing an intent to exclude all Muslims
on terrorism grounds.286 It is not at all clear that courts will be willing
to constrain the President’s immigration power in cases without direct
evidence of animus.
We have yet to see whether courts will be similarly willing to
constrain the President’s authority to limit procedural protections for
noncitizens charged with removability or expand the detention of
noncitizens without a bond hearing pending deportation proceedings,
for example. Contemporary immigration jurisprudence suggests that
they will not. In these ways, the non-delegation theory falls short of
the ultimate goal of protecting noncitizens’ rights.
2. Close Judicial Scrutiny Regardless of Immigrants’ Interests
Finally, even when a given immigration decision is made by an
agency official, the denial of plenary power to such decisions pursuant
to the non-delegation theory will not necessarily coincide with
noncitizens’ interests. That is, close judicial scrutiny may be as likely
to reverse an agency decision protecting noncitizens as those harming
them.
To be sure, most cases denying plenary power to agency officials
have ultimately ruled in favor of noncitizens’ interests. But that
coincidence may be due to the structure of immigration
decisionmaking. Most immigration cases litigated in federal court are
brought by noncitizens who have been denied an immigration benefit
such as admission, release from detention, or relief from removal. A
grant of immigration benefits, by contrast, would not be appealed to
federal court unless there is an intra-branch conflict, in which the
prosecutorial arm of the executive branch (typically from
Immigration and Customs Enforcement) disagrees with the decision
of the adjudicative arm of the executive branch (typically the
Executive Office for Immigration Review). As officials from both
agencies ultimately answer to the President, such intra-branch
disagreements are relatively infrequent. Where they do occur,

3d 724, 733 (E.D. Va. 2017); Louhghalam v. Trump, 230 F. Supp. 3d 26, 32 (D. Mass.
2017). Lower court decisions reviewing the second version of the travel ban include
Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 772 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v.
Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 575–77 (en banc) (4th Cir. 2017); Sarsour v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d
719, 724 (E.D. Va. 2017); Doe v. Trump, No. 17-cv-112, 2017 WL 975996, at *1 (W.D.
Wisc. Mar. 10, 2017).
286. See, e.g., Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 773 n.14; Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at
575–76; Washington, 847 F.3d at 1157.
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however, a retreat from plenary power rooted in non-delegation
principles may result in as much judicial skepticism toward agency
decisions that promote an alien’s interests as toward those that
compromise such interests.
The lower court decisions enjoining the Obama administration’s
deferred action programs demonstrate that administrative decisions
favoring noncitizens may be as susceptible to judicial reversal as those
disfavoring them. In November 2014, Secretary of Homeland Security
Jeh Johnson issued a memorandum directing immigration officials to
grant “deferred action” providing temporary relief from deportation
and work authorization to millions of unauthorized aliens who were
either brought to the United States as children or were parents of
U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residence.287 Twenty-five states filed
suit to enjoin the policy, and in February of 2015, the District Court
for the Southern District of Texas granted a preliminary injunction to
enjoin implementation of the program. In doing so, it emphasized
that it was not reviewing the power of the President himself, but
rather the scope of power delegated to the administrative agency.288
As such, the court concluded that the States were likely to succeed on
the merits of their claim that the policy was required to undergo
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures set forth in the APA in
order to take effect.289

287. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Thomas Winkowski, Acting
Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, and R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S.
Customs & Border Prot. (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files
/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf/ [https://perma.cc/PG76-2F55] (directing
officials to grant deferred action to individuals who came to the United States as children
and with respect to certain individuals who are the parents of U.S. citizens or permanent
residents). But see Letter from Jefferson B. Sessions III, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to
Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/994651/download [https://perma.cc/P7AD-HQMWs]
(advising the Department of Homeland Security to “consider and orderly and efficient
wind-down” of the deferred action program).
288. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 607 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (“[B]oth sides
agree that the President in his official capacity has not directly instituted any program at
issue in this case. Regardless of the fact that the Executive Branch has made public
statements to the contrary, there are no executive orders or other presidential
proclamations or communique that exist regarding DAPA. The DAPA Memorandum
issued by Secretary Johnson is the focus in this suit.”), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015),
aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.).
289. See id. at 676. See generally Jill E. Family, Administrative Law Through the Lens
of Immigration Law, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 565 (2012) (applying administrative law
distinction between legislative rules and non-legislative rules for purposes of notice-andcomment rulemaking requirements to immigration law).
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.290 It agreed that the agency
violated the procedural requirements of the APA and went further to
hold that the policy was substantively invalid.291 Concluding that even
if the Chevron framework applied, the deferred action policy was not
entitled to deference because it was “manifestly contrary” to the
Immigration and Nationality Act.292 In this case, then, the lower
courts exercised close judicial scrutiny pursuant to ordinary
administrative law standards to reverse an administrative immigration
policy designed to protect aliens. These opinions suggest that under a
non-delegation theory of plenary power, judicial review over the
immigration decisions of agency officials may be as likely to harm
noncitizens’ interests as to promote them.
CONCLUSION
The much-maligned plenary power doctrine, which categorically
insulated immigration decisions from ordinary standards of judicial
scrutiny, has been in decline. Contrary to conventional wisdom, this
retreat may be less rooted in judicial solicitude toward noncitizens’
rights than a growing concern regarding the breadth of policymaking
power exercised by our nation’s administrative agencies. This
observation sheds new light on the scope and limits of the plenary
power doctrine today. It suggests that courts will retreat from plenary
power principles to exercise meaningful judicial scrutiny over
immigration decisions made by agency officials, which constitute the
vast majority of immigration decisions today. However, plenary
power principles appear to remain intact to insulate immigration
decisions rendered directly by Congress or the President from
meaningful review. Moreover, even where the relevant decisionmaker
is an administrative official, close scrutiny over immigration decisions
may be as likely to reverse policies designed to protect noncitizens’
interests as those designed to harm them.
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